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The energy crises of the 1970's fueled numerous congressional
hearings and debates as legislators searched frantically for politically
acceptable ways to increase the United States' energy efficiency and
to reduce its dependency on imported oil. Among the many solu-
tions offered by various commissioned studies and expert witnesses
was one to revive an old technology: cogeneration. Cogeneration
involves the simultaneous production of electricity and some other
form of useful energy.' Whereas central station generation of elec-
tricity is only about thirty-three percent efficient, combined genera-
tion of electricity with industrial process steam or heat can be sixty to
eighty percent efficient.' Thus, Congress was informed that, with
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1. More exactly, the term cogeneration refers to the combined production of any two
forms of useful energy from the sequential use of energy from a single fuel source. Thus, it can
refer to the combined production of mechanical and thermal energy, for example. In general
parlance, and throughout the energy legislation discussed here, however, the term more nar-
rowly refers to the combined production of electricity and useful thermal energy. Even within
this more narrow definition, there are still a variety of forms of cogeneration. Electricity may
be produced from the exhaust heat or steam of an industrial process in a "bottoming cycle"
system. Or, reversing the sequence, waste heat from electrical generation may be used for
space heating or process needs in a "topping cycle" system. Systems may range in size from
small "package" units designed to supply the heating and power needs of a single building to
large custom-built units designed to produce millions of pounds of steam per hour for process
needs and power production. While the size of the system is not material to the discussion
here, ownership is. Since most of the recent legislative effort to encourage cogeneration has
focused on the private production of electricity and some other form of thermal energy, the
term "cogeneration" will be used in this more restricted sense throughout this article unless
otherwise specified.
2. The inherent inefficiency of central station generation, limited by the laws of thermo-
dynamics to around 33% efficiency, has been stressed repeatedly in congressional reports. See
S. REP. No. 442, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 21
[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 442]; GAO report, Industrial Cogeneration- What It Is, How
It Works, Its Potential, April 29, 1980 EMD-80-7, at 1. A variety of figures on the efficiency of
cogeneration have been bandied about. See T. Casten & H. Ross, Cogeneration and Its Regu-
lations, 108 PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY 18-21 [hereinafter cited as Casten & Ross]; F.
industrial use of cogeneration, fuel efficiencies could be obtained
which theoretically could reduce the total energy consumption of the
United States by fifteen percent by 1985.1
Moreover, since the technology for cogeneration was developed
in the nineteenth century, cogeneration appeared to be a ready rem-
edy for the nation's energy ills. Lengthy research and development
programs were not needed, and cogeneration already was economi-
cally competitive if institutional barriers to its development were re-
moved.4 Spurred by this testimony, Congress enacted a series of
provisions to encourage the redevelopment of cogeneration.
This article examines these provisions and evaluates their effec-
tiveness. Since much of the recent legislation merely attempts to re-
move barriers previously created by legislation and regulation,
however, the causes of the earlier demise of cogeneration first are
traced. Thus, this article chronicles how the law has interacted with
a technology first to curtail the technology's development and then
to reverse the process. Finally, the article evaluates the effectiveness
of the current legal revitalization effort.
II. The Demise of Cogeneration
At the turn of the century, over fifty percent of the electricity
consumed in this country was cogenerated.5 Electricity was primar-
ily produced by reciprocating engines, which exhausted steam as a
waste by-product. Many industries found it cost-effective to install
these engines to supply steam for space heating or process needs as
well as for electricity. Any surplus electricity was sold to other con-
cerns nearby-usually in the same block, giving rise to the term
"block plant." Electric utilities, which had to use engines of similar
size and type, found it difficult to compete with these industrial con-
cerns unless they also could recoup some of the cost of the plant
from the sale of the waste steam. Thus, Consolidated Edison, which
opened the first central station generating plant in 1882 in New York
City, purchased the New York Steam Company and entered the dis-
trict heating business the same year.6
Cross, Cogeneration. Its Potential and Incentives for Development, 3 HARV. ENV'TAL L. REV.
236 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Cross].
3. Even with more realistic projections of its application, expert testimony at the Na-
tional Energy Act Hearings still indicated that cogeneration could reduce current electrical
consumption anywhere from 10 to 75 percent. Cross, supra note 2, at 238 (citing National
Energy Act, Part 3, Vol. I. Hearings on HR 6660 and 6831 Before the Subcommittee on Energy
and Power of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP. Nos. 6660,
6831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 335, 341 (1977)).
4. S. REP. No. 442, supra note 2, at 21, 33.
5. Because of the paucity of data, figures on the extent of cogeneration are rough esti-
mates. The above figure is an estimate of the Edison Electric Institute, Wall St. J., Feb. 29,
1981, at 31.
6. R. MEADOR, COGENERATION AND DISTRICT HEATING 34 (1981).
By 1902, 3600 private and public electric generating systems op-
erated in the United States. The typical electric plant had a generat-
ing capacity of 200 to 300 kilowatts and served a distribution area of
less than one square mile.' Only one state regulated electricity
sales,8 and municipalities generally permitted, if not actually en-
couraged, competition. In 1887, for example, New York City gave
franchises to six companies, while Denver permitted anyone to start
an electric company as long as public thoroughfares were not ob-
structed.9 Industries competed forcefully with utilities in supplying
electricity to small neighborhood blocks.
A4. The Growth of Economies of Scale
In 1903 a major technological advance occurred, the develop-
ment of the turbogenerator. These new units could send steam
through a turbine to produce mechanical energy that then was con-
verted into electricity by a directly connected generator. This devel-
opment produced huge economies in electric power generation, but
also reduced the quality of the steam emerging as a waste product.
Furthermore, the change in technology permitted a shift from direct
current to alternating current, which greatly increased the distance
utilities economically could transmit and distribute electricity. Thus,
district heating became less economical from the utilities' viewpoint,
while large scale central generation became more economical.' °
By 1910, the new technology had become the norm for the in-
dustry. To realize the economies available with new plants, utility
companies sought rapid increases in their load requirements." I Since
industries were the only large users of electricity at this time, utilities
naturally tried to find ways to induce large industrial users to
purchase electricity instead of generating it themselves.
7. J. Johnson, Government Ownership ofElectric Utilities, in 10 THE REFERENCE SHELF
No. 9, at 102 [hereinafter cited as Johnson]. Bauer notes that in 1900 the maximum size of a
generating unit was 3500 kw. Such a unit occupied a floor space of 35 by 70 feet, with a height
of 75 feet. Thus, massing a number of these units involved high building costs, as well as high
equipment costs. J. BAUER, THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 19 (1939) [hereinafter cited as
BAUER].
8. Massachusetts initiated regulation of electricity sales and service in 1887. W. JONES,
REGULATED INDUSTRIES 67 (1967) [hereinafter cited as JONES].
9. Johnson, supra note 7, at 54.
10. Industrial cogeneration, however, did not immediatley become uneconomic. Writing
in 1918, the Missouri Public Service Commission noted:
It is well-known among utility operators that the large isolated plant generating elec-
tricity and producing steam for heating is the most serious competitor of the central
station generating electricity only. As the combined service can be rendered at a
smaller investment and operating cost than if the two classes of service are supplied
from separate plants, it is very difficult for the central station to supply such consum-
ers with electricity at a price sufficiently attractive to persuade the owner to shut
down his electric plant, use the central station's energy, and operate his private plant
to supply the heating only.
In re Union Electric Light and Power Co., 1918E Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 490, 512.
II. The economies of scale and resultant decrease in marginal costs (expenses for addi-
In 1912, for example, about 500 privately owned generating
plants operated in Boston Edison's service area. Some were indus-
trial concerns; others were property owners who furnished power
and heat to tenants. To induce these private generators to stop gen-
erating electricity, Boston Edison offered to let them buy power at
wholesale rates and to resell to any tenants or current customers at
retail rates.' 2 Thus, the practice of sub-metering was born.
Conversely, Union Electric (U-E) offered attractive long-term,
fixed-price contracts for steam and electricity service to about forty
self-generators in the St. Louis area. In return, U-E obtained leases
to the self-generators' in-house plants. U-E closed down some of
these plants entirely, but retained the more profitable ones and even
connected adjacent customers to them. During the heating season,
U-E provided electricity and heat to these businesses by operating
the leased cogenerating plants. In the summer, however, U-E shut
down these plants and provided electricity from its central generat-
ing station. The utility thus could choose the most economical mix
between local and central station power generation.' 3
Virtually all utilities offered preferential rates to industrial cus-
tomers. These rates often were set well below the utilities' embedded
costs;' 4 the utilities reasoned that if they encouraged more electricity
consumption, they could build more of the new and cheaper plants.
In this manner, average costs per kilowatt-hour would fall more rap-
idly and thereby would lead to more rapid growth of the electric
utility industry. As a result of this utility policy, it became economi-
cally unattractive for many industrial firms to operate old cogenera-
tion plants when these below-cost rates for utility-supplied power
tional unit of electricity generated) that utilities wished to exploit can be seen in the following
table:
Max. Size Prime Mover 0 & M Efficiency
Year Of Unit Cost ($/kw) Cost (e/kwh) (Btu/kwh)
1900 3,500 40 .20=.020 26,000
1910 10,000 20 .008 20,000
1930 90,000 12 .004 10,000
(Monetary figures appear to be expressed in current year dollars). BAUER, supra note 7, at 18-
23.
12. In re Boston Edison Company, 98 Pub. Util. Rep. (NS) 427 (1953); Boston Real
Estate Bd. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Public Utilities, 15 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 47 (1956).
13. Additionally, U-E encouraged another 46 businesses in downtown St. Louis to give
up cogeneration by providing electricity and space heating from its efficient "modern" district
heating plant on Tenth Street. In re Union Electric Light & Power Co., 1918E Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR) 490. State ex re. Washington University v. Public Service Comm'n, 1926 A. Pub. Util.
Rep. (PUR) 764.
14. Embedded costs are frequently equated with the average costs of utility. They in-
clude not only the variable costs of fuel, operation and maintenance, but also the capital costs
already incurred for plant, transmission and distribution. These capital costs must be recov-
ered in the rates to produce the return required by investors, but utilities typically have been
free in the past to recover these costs from whichever customers they desired. Thus, residential




Noting the changes occurring in the electrical industry, state
governments began to control electrical corporations through the
states' public service laws to avert the "ruinous competition" of a
newly perceived natural monopoly.' 6 By 1915, fifteen of the twenty
most populous states had brought some aspect of private power pro-
duction under public service commission control.
17
Although the definitions of "electrical corporation" employed
by these states generally were quite similar,'I the state did not agree
as to when a private generator of power became an electrical corpo-
ration subject to public utility regulation. Some states placed a gloss
on the definition that included a requirement for the electrical busi-
ness to be deemed "affected with a public interest" before it would
15. Sometimes these rates were even below the incremental costs (the fuel and variable
operation and maintenance costs) of the power supplied. For further discussion of this phe-
nomenon, see BAUER, supra note 7, at 84.
16. In economic theory, industries with continually declining marginal cost curves are
"natural monopolies." Because of high fixed costs, the larger the firm, the lower its per unit
costs. Thus, there is a tendency for the firm that grows most rapidly to put its competitors out
of business. Averting the waste of societal resources involved in such destructive or "ruinous"
competition has been one of the major factors motivating public regulation of a number of
industries. (The railroad industry has probably been the most notable example of regulation
based on this premise.)
Massachusetts appears to have had a regulatory policy based on the theory of the natural
monopoly of the electrical industry as early as 1912: "The established policy of the Common-
wealth (is) said to be that so long as an electric utility in any given territory (is) rendering
adequate and proper service, the public interest (is) better served by public supervision and
regulation than by competition." In re Clinton Appeal, Pub. Util. Rep. Digest (PUR) 2147
(1912).
That the natural monopoly justification for the regulation of the electrical industry has
been a continuing motivating force in regulatory policy can be seen in the following 1960
statement of the Oregon Public Service Commission:
The basic premise of the free enterprise system is that free competition among busi-
ness acts as a natural regulator of prices and service. Enterprises which furnish elec-
trical utility service, however, are natural monopolies, that is for the most part there
is no adequate substitute for the service they furnish and they must invest huge sums
in permanent physical plant and extend it to the very locations where it is used ...
The existence of competition between such enterprises is contrary to the public inter-
est since it results in unnecessary and wasteful duplication of capital facilities, in-
creased operating expenses, and a splitting of revenue, which ultimately results in
higher costs and consequently higher rates to consumers.
In re Portland General Electric Co., 32 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 497, 517 (1960).
17. The twenty states in this survey were the most populous states as of 1960. Of the
fifteen exercising some sort of regulatory control, all controlled the price of service, eleven
controlled the issuance of securities, ten controlled the commencement of service and eight
controlled mergers or transfer of assets. JONES, supra note note 8, at 67.
18. A typical definition of "electrical corporation" provides as follows:
[Elvery corporation, company, association, partnership and person, their lessees,
trustees or receivers appointed by any court whatsoever (other than a railroad or
street railroad corporation generating electricity solely for railroad or street railroad
purposes or for the use of its tenants and not for sale to others) owning, operating, or
managing any electrical plant except where electricity is generated or distributed by
the producer solely on or through private property for railroad or street railroad pur-
poses or for its own use or the use of its tenants and not for sale to others.
N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAW § 2(13) (McKinney 1955).
be subject to regulation. t9 Others did not. The Missouri Supreme
Court, in determining that a brewing company selling surplus elec-
tricity to nearby businesses and residences was not a public utility,
noted that in the few cases in which this issue previously had arisen,
"the holdings of the courts thereon, while not absolutely unanimous,
[were] usually against the contentions of the appellants here ...,
while a very few courts, and the public service commissions rather
unanimously, have held to the contrary."2
The contradictory decisions noted by the Missouri Supreme
Court, however, were an early sign of future regulatory difficulty and
uncertainty for cogenerators. Another sign was the conflicting poli-
cies of state commissions toward mining and lumber companies.
When moving into new territory, these firms frequently erected
power plants to meet production needs, and then provided electricity
to the camp towns that grew up nearby. Sometimes they also in-
stalled water systems. These "company towns" were remote and
often would have lacked such services if the company had not pro-
vided them. Courts and commissions in some states determined that
these company operations were subject to PUC jurisdiction2' and
did not in others.22 These cases subsequently were used as prece-
dents to determine whether other manufacturers who sold surplus
electricity also were subject to commission jurisdiction. States that
already had classified mining companies or lumber firms as public
utilities for supplying electricity or water to their workers were likely
to view industrial cogenerators as utilities as well.
A parallel issue that was adjudicated during the same period
concerned utilities that engaged in the steam heating business. By
19. This justification for regulation as we know it today was first set forth in Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). In this case the Supreme Court held that when "one devotes his
property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an
interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to
the extent of the interest he has thus created."
20. State ex rel. M.O. Danciger and Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 275 Mo. 483, 205
S.W. 42 (1918). As well as surveying the holdings of other states and commissions, the court
also noted that the brewery owner did not serve all people within the area, did not own any
transmission or distribution equipment (people who desired power were required to run a line
to the plant's door), had no franchises or licenses, made no assertion of eminent domain, nor
ever professed public service. Thus, the court did not feel the definition should be applied
literally.
21. See, e.g., In re Commonwealth Mining and Milling Co., 1915B Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR) 536 (Ariz); Public Service Comm'n v. Valley Mercantile Co., 1921D Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR) 803 (Mont); Sandpoint Water and Light Co. v. Humbird Lumber, 1919B Pub. Util.
Rep. (PUR) 535 (Idaho); Wyoming Valley Water Supply Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,
1932D Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 86 (Pa.).
22. Courts have often overturned commission rulings assuming jurisdiction over firms
selling surplus energy. See Humbird Lumber v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 1925A Pub. Util.
Rep. (PUR) 225 (Idaho); Holdred Colleries v. Boone City Coal Corp., Pub. Util. Rep. Digest
(PUR) 2674 (1924). In Public Service Comm'n v. Montana Water and Power Co., 1926A Pub.
Util. Rep. (PUR) 689, the Montana Supreme Court offers a good review of decisions both
upholding and rejecting assignment of public utility status to firms selling electricity as an
incidental part of their business.
1917, for example, Union Electric found that it was losing money on
the long-term, fixed price leases it had made to entice cogenerators to
forego operation of their own plants in favor of U-E produced steam
and electricity.23 Thus, U-E asked the Missouri Public Service Com-
mission to allow an increase in the rates charged for steam and elec-
tricity to these long-lease customers. In requesting this, the utility
requested that its steam operation come under the jurisdiction of the
PSC.
2 4
Not surprisingly, the affected customers opposed the PSC as-
suming jurisdiction and raising the rates.25 Unlike in the brewery
case, however, the Missouri Supreme Court this time supported the
PSC in its jurisdictional claim. The court also upheld the upward
revision of contract rates, noting that the United States Supreme
Court already had held that "contract prices count for naught in the
fixing of rates by the Public Service Commission. 26
A number of states joined Missouri in declaring steam heating
operations to be public utilities.27  Others, however, ruled that ex-
haust steam or heat furnished under contract was not a public serv-
ice because it was not furnished to the public generally. The Illinois
Commerce Commission upheld the right of a utility to terminate the
supplying of heat to four properties, and declared that
the fact that a company may be a public utility as to electric serv-
ice [does not] tend in any way to constitute it a public utility as to
other commodities, products or service in which it may deal by
private contract. Even as to the same service a company may as to
one class of customers be a public utility, and as to another a pri-
vate corporation not subject to regulation.28
Interestingly, in the vast majority of these cases, the PSC or
state court ruled in a manner that strengthened the utility's economic
23. See supra notes 5, 13.
24. In re Union Electric Light & Power Co., 1918E Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 490. The
Public Service Commission willingly granted U-E's request. It held that because U-E's charter
permitted it to enter the steam heating business, even a business limited in scope and confined
to private contracts was in fact a public service and therefore subject to commission
jurisdiction.
25. The customers argued that U-E's district heating operation was a private enterprise
since U-E did not own the production equipment in question, but leased it under private con-
tract. Since these contracts had been entered into prior to the passage of the public service
commission law, and there was no distribution network requiring franchises, the contracts
could not be abrogated. Id. at 496.
26. State ex rel. Washington University v. Public Service Comm'n, 1926A Pub. Util.
Rep. (PUR) 764, 767 (Mo.).
27. In 1960, twenty-four states controlled the sale of steam heating. JONES, supra note 8,
at 67. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held that a utility that had only one steam con-
tract came under the jurisdiction of the state PUC and could file a new tariff higher than the
old contract price if the PUC approved. Beetem v. Carlisle Light, Heat & Power Co., 1922D
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 258 (Pa.).
28. Scheinger v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 1925B Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 334,
339 (Ill.). The Washington Supreme Court similarly ruled that a utility furnishing steam heat
to a kiln was not rendering public service. Sunset Shingle Co. v. Northwest Electric & Water
Works, 118 Wash. 416, 203 P. 978 (1922).
position. For example, the Missouri commission upheld U-E's re-
quest to have its steam operations be considered a public service be-
cause the old contract prices then could be raised to improve U-E's
overall financial position. In the Illinois case, the utility wished to
discontinue uneconomic operations, and it could only do this if it
was not bound to serve the public. The Commission obliged by de-
claring that the steam operations were private.
Courts and commissions, however, became increasingly unsym-
pathetic towards "competition" with the public electricity utility. In
1908, the New York Public Service Commission had ordered public
utilities to provide central station service to private plant owners
when their equipment broke down. Utility managers disliked pro-
viding this service and argued that the policy of permitting private
plants to undercut the utility's prices by using this service instead of
providing their own backup equipment was unfair. In 1919, New
York Edison asserted this argument and refused to provide backup
service for a grocery, which operated a private plant that generated
electricity for the grocery and for three other buildings on the block.
The commission ordered provision of the service, but the appeals
court reversed the order, holding that when the grocery supplied cus-
tomers other than its tenants, it assumed a "public function" and
therefore was in competition with New York Edison. The court
stated that "one competitor need not serve another."2 9
By 1935 the New York Public Service Commission appeared to
hold views similar to the appeals court. In a major proceeding re-
viewing the rates and regulations for backup service, the Commis-
sion asked, "Why should [the utility's] competition be relieved of all
responsibility and the central station company compelled to take
over the obligations of private plants?" 30 The Commission found
that the utilities were within their rights in denying parallel opera-
tion to private plant owners3' and recommended segregated wiring,
with the private firm prohibited from switching any unsegregated
part of the plant to the central station unless the whole system was
switched. Only reluctantly did the Commission permit "multiple
throw switching" 32 on a temporary basis. Thus, private generators
had to install a second transmission and distribution system if they
wished to have utility-provided backup service.
The Commission also found that utilities should "require instal-
29. People ex rel. New York Edison v. Public Service Comm'n, 191 A.D. 237, 181 N.Y.S.
259 (1920).
30. In re New York Edison Co., 16 Pub. Util. Rep. (NS) 120, 126 (1937).
31. Parallel operation permits the private generator to send electricity to the central sta-
tion or draw from the station at will.
32. Multiple throw switching permits connection of the private system part-by-part to the
utility's system.
lation of equipment to positively prevent contracted for demand be-
ing exceeded except to private plant operators who do not sell
electrical energy."' 33 Consequently, self-generators who sold any sur-
plus electricity had to buy their own reserve capacity. If a self-gener-
ator could not meet the peak load of his customers, then, in the
Commission's view, "he should segregate a portion of the system and
turn it over to the central station for its service."' 34 In response to an
objection that the proposed regulations did not take account of pos-
sible off-peak use of the central station by private owners or the "di-
versity factor,"'35 the Commission merely commented that such
factors were of "little significance" and were difficult to ascertain.
There was no consideration of whether small plants should be re-
quired to supply their own reserve capacity when the central station
already had such reserve capacity in place.
The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU) simi-
larly tightened regulations over the years with respect to private re-
sale of electricity. As already noted, Boston Ed originally had
instituted sub-metering to induce private generators to forfeit their
plants and to join the Edison system.36 In the 1930's, however, the
DPU noted an increase in sub-metering from large property owners
buying power at wholesale and reselling it to their tenants at retail.
No action was taken to halt this abuse until 1948, however, when
Boston Edison refused to accept any new resale customers. In 1953,
Boston Edison decided to abolish resale of electricity altogether.
The DPU approved the abolition and stated that "if anyone sees fit
to become an electrical company as defined in the statutes, we shall
promptly assume jurisdiction over its rates and practices to precisely
the same extent as we do over those of Edison. ' 37 This admonition
was directed to "any building which decides that there is an eco-
nomic advantage to be derived form installing an electric generating
plant."38
In many states utilities were required to obtain a "certificate of
public convenience and necessity" before they could begin construc-
tion of a new facility. Even if a commercial or industrial firm was
willing to file the necessary reports and to subject itself to scrutiny as
a public utility, commissions often still were reluctant to issue a cer-
33. In re New York Edison Co., 16 Pub. Util. Rep. (NS) 120, 126 (1937).
34. Id. at 140.
35. The diversity factor is the figure assumed as representing the incidence of simultane-
ous breakdown of private plants. If one assumes, for example, that only half of these plants
are likely to break down at any one time and require backup service, then only one-half their
rated capacity would have to be provided in reserve capacity in a centralized backup system.
36. See supra note 5.
37. In re Boston Edison, 98 Pub. Util. Rep. (NS) 427, 459 (1953).
38. Id. The Boston Realty Board appealed this ruling, but the Massachusetts Supreme
Court upheld the DPU. See Boston Real Estate Bd. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Public Utilities,
334 Mass. 497, 136 N.E.2d 243 (1956).
tificate of convenience to a nonutility business. Commissions per-
ceived the cogenerator as a competitor of the entrenched utility, the
solvency of which the commissions felt bound to protect. If a utility
already could supply the electrical load for the firm and its proposed
customers, then installation of a cogeneration unit would have been
an unnecesary duplication of resources, in view of the
commissions.39
Thus, when the "total energy" system,4 ° a new form of cogener-
ation emerged in the 1960s, proponents rapidly found that regula-
tions made operation of such systems very tricky, if not impossible.
For example, a Massachusetts developer applied for an advisory rul-
ing on whether a total energy system would be subject to regulation.
The DPU noted that, although in other states the public nature of
the activity might determine whether it should be regulated or not, in
Massachusetts it was the sale of the electricity that subjected the sys-
tem to regulation. If the developer metered the gas or electricity, the
activity would be a sale subject to DPU regulation; if the gas and
electricity were included as part of the rent, then the activity would
not be subject to DPU regulation.4'
In Utah the United States Circuit Court for the Tenth Circuit
ruled that a shopping center, which already had installed a total en-
ergy system at a cost of $1,500,000, could not operate the plant be-
cause the shopping center had no certificate of convenience. 42 All
the stores except one in the mall were tenants of the mall owner.
The court ruled, however, that because that one store was not a ten-
ant and because the public used the mall, the mall was dedicated to
public use. The federal court, deciding the issue in the context of an
antitrust suit by the mall owner against the utility, concluded that it
did
not think Utah would permit this intrusion into the field of public
utility by one who would be unregulated both from the standpoint
of what it could do to its customers and, more so, the damage it
could do to the public good by an uneconomic duplication of fa-
cilities and a raid on power company's customers to the detriment
of all public power users.
43
39. In some states, utilities were granted exclusive rights to serve an area. Thus, it was
not legally possible for a commission to give a certificate of convenience to another business
even if it might have been willing to do so. N. DEAN, ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN INDUSTRY 159
(1980) [hereinafter cited as DEAN].
40. A total energy plant is an isolated unit, usually gas-fired, that provides all the heat-
ing, cooling and lighting needs of a large apartment complex or shopping center. Unless a
hookup for backup service is included, these systems are entirely isolated from the electric
utility.
41. The DPU did acknowledge, however, that the developer might meter the tenants for
two years to establish a fair basis for the rental charge. In re Frank Properties, Inc., 72 Pub.
Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 305 (1968).
42. Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 440 F.2d 36, 42
(10th Cir. 1971).
43. See id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a Public Service Commission decision
C. Local Regulation: The Franchise
Cogenerators not only suffered from adverse state rulings, but
they also encountered difficulties obtaining franchises' from munic-
ipalities. Some states gave municipalities the privilege of granting
exclusive franchises. Because a franchise is considered a property
right, if an exclusive franchise was issued, an industrial cogenerator
could not obtain a franchise from a local government unless the in-
cumbent utility agreed to its issuance or unless the government exer-
cised its power of eminent domain and compensated the utility.45 In
the early 1970s, nearly one half the states still permitted local gov-
ernments to issue exclusive franchises.
46
Even nonexclusive franchises were difficult and expensive to ob-
tain. In some states, the local legislature had to approve the issuance
of a franchise; others required a community referendum. Such ap-
proval was not easy to obtain if a well-funded utility opposed an
alternative power source.47
D. Federal Impediments
In addition to all these difficulties, the United States Depart-
ment of Justice prosecuted a number of paper companies on anti-
trust grounds. Because of their huge energy needs, paper companies
made extensive use of their hydro and waste-wood resources to gen-
erate electricity. Through a series of court cases in the 1930s, how-
ever, the Justice Department forced paper companies to choose
between the paper business or the electric power business. Most
gave up their power business-although a few developed independ-
ent subsidiaries that became public utilities.48
denying jurisdiction over a developer who wished to install a total energy system because the
developer would be selling energy to his tenants only and not to the public at large. See Sun
Prairie v. Wis. Public Service Comm'n, 71 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 417 (1968); In re Sun
Prairie, 57 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d 525 (PUR) (1965). The uncertainty and inconsistency in these
state decisions, however, severely retarded the development of total energy systems.
44. A franchise is a special privilege or right granted to a corporation or an individual by
a local or state government. In this case it is the right to cross a street or public right-of-way
with an electrical line.
45. DEAN, supra note 39, at 163. See regulations cited infra note 80.
46. DEAN, supra note 39, at 163.
47. In Oklahoma, a developer proposed to install a total energy plant in a new develop-
ment. The plant was to serve residences and businesses within the project area only.
Oklahoma Gas and Electric sued both the developer and the energy company, saying that they
first had to obtain a franchise. Although Oklahoma Gas and Electric's franchise was nonex-
clusive, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the developer could not keep a perpetual
easement on the streets of the development, and therefore a franchise was required before any
electricity could be transmitted or distributed. (This effectively blocked the project because
obtaining a franchise required approval by the voters of the entire municipal area, not just
residents of the development.) Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Total Energy, Inc., 499 P.2d
917 (Okla. 1972).
48. C. Berg, Conservation in Industry, SCIENCE, April 19, 1974, at 264-70. (The author
has been unable to find the cases alluded to here.)
At the same time, the passage of the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act (PUHCA) raised the issue whether paper companies
that were in the power business also came under the Act's jurisdic-
tion. At least one paper company apparently divested itself of its
electric power subsidiaries when the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission was determining whether the firm was a holding company
under PUHCA.49 A number of paper companies that originally
called themselves "paper and power" companies dropped "power"
from their titles after divesting themselves of power production
subsidiaries."
Thus, while the economies of scale and decreasing marginal cost
curves associated with the new generating technologies were compel-
ling economic factors encouraging central station generation, the le-
gal process clearly abetted the move to central station generation.
Commissions permitted rates that were below embedded costs in the
belief that the more electrical production was encouraged, the
cheaper electrical production would become for all. Similar reason-
ing also induced commissions to acquiese to utility desires for high
rates for backup or standby service. Such acquiescence, of course,
made self-generation even less economical.
Once the idea that the production of electricity was a natural
monopoly gained wide acceptance, questions of economic efficiency
that might have favored cogeneration never were raised. Cogenera-
tion never was differentiated from general resale of utility electricity
in producing bans on sub-metering, nor from less efficient forms of
electrical generation in narrowing definitions of those exempt from
public service commission jurisdiction. Few incentives motivated
firms to seek competitive technological developments in cogenera-
tion, while extra difficulties and expense with the regulatory process
created strong disincentives. For these reasons cogeneration slowly
died away; by 1975, only four percent of electricity in the United
States still was cogenerated.5'
III. The Federal Attempt to Revive Cogeneration
In the extensive congressional hearings prior to passage of the
49. Between 1939 and 1941, the International Paper and Power Company divested itself
of its power operations in accordance with an order issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1982 (1956).
50. Subsequent to its divestiture, the International Paper and Power Company changed
its name to the International Paper Company. Id. Abitibi Paper and Power made a similar
change, to Abitibi Paper in 1965. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2201 (1979).
51. S. REP. No. 442, supra note 2, at 7918. The major part of this decline in percent is
attributable to the increase in electrical consumption that has occurred. Since 1969, however,
there has been a real number decline in cogeneration. R. Barnes & P. Hodiak, Cogeneration in
Industrial Plants, in COGENERATION OF ELECTRICITY AND USEFUL HEAT 28 (B. Wilkinson &
R. Barnes, eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Wilkinson & Barnes].
bills that comprised the National Energy Act of 1978, cogeneration
repeatedly was put forward as a known technology that substantially
could improve energy efficiency. 2 It also was noted, however, that
legal and institutional barriers inhibited the development of much
cogeneration that otherwise would be commercially feasible. To
remedy this situation, Congress inserted provisions to encourage
cogeneration in four of five of the enactments that comprise the Na-
tional Energy Act. 3
A. The Minor Elements of the Legislative Package. FUA, NGPA,
NE CPA
Two of these acts merely prevented, or offered the possibility of
preventing, the erection of more institutional barriers to cogenera-
tion's development. Congress desired to reduce the country's depen-
dence on imported oil and to conserve its increasingly scarce natural
gas resources. Thus in the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act
(FUA), Congress prohibited electric utilities and major industrial
fuel burners54 from burning oil or natural gas as the primary fuel in
any new installations and authorized conversion of existing oil and
natural gas burning plants to other fuels where feasible. The FUA
would have prevented installation of any large oil or gas-fired
cogeneration units; Congress, however, inserted a provision author-
izing the Secretary of Energy, in his discretion, to issue cogenerators
a permanent exemption from these restrictions.5
Similarly, the incremental pricing provisions of the Natural Gas
52. See supra note 1.
53. The National Energy Act actually was composed of five acts: The Public Utilities
Regulatory Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617; The Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618;
The National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619; The Powerplant and In-
dustrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620; The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-621. Only the Energy Tax Act lacked provisions to encourage cogeneration.
54. A major fuel-burning installation (MFBI) was defined as
a stationary unit consisting of a boiler, gas turbine unit, combined cycle unit, or inter-
nal combustion engine which-i) has a design capability of consuming any fuel (or
mixture thereof) at a fuel heat input rate of 100 million BTU's per hour or greater or,
ii) is in a combination of two or more such units which are located at the same site
which in the aggregate have a design capability of consuming any fuel (or mixture
therefore) at a fuel input rate of 250 million BTU's per hour or greater.
42 U.S.C.A. § 8302(10(A) (West Supp. 1982).
55. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8322(c) (West Supp. 1982) offered the discretionary exemption to new
facilities. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8352(c) (West Supp. 1982) offered the exemption to existing facilities.
Both sections read as follows:
After consideration of a petition (and comments thereon) for an exemption from one
or more of the prohibitions of part A for a cogeneration facility, the Secretary may,
by order, grant a permanent exemption under this subsection with respect to natural
gas or petroleum, if he-(I) finds that the petitioner has demonstrated that economic
and other benefits of cogeneration are unobtainable unless petroleum or natural gas,
or both, are used in such facility, and (2) includes in the final order a statement of the
basis for such finding.
The discretionary aspect of this exemption has created almost as many difficulties for MFBIs
that desire to burn oil or gas as the FUA prohibitions themselves. See infra note 121 and
accompanying text.
Policy Act (NGPA) made one of the most efficient forms of cogener-
ation, the gas-combustion turbine, less attractive economically.
Congress, therefore, authorized the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to promulgate rules providing an exemption
from these provisions to qualifying cogenerators; 56 the FERC has
promulgated such rules.57
A third act in the legislative package, the National Energy Con-
servation Policy Act (NECPA) amended the Energy Policy and Con-
servation Act of 1974 to provide grants for cogeneration systems.58
Since cogeneration projects were only one type of project among
many competing for the limited funds available in this program,59
the chief virtue of this provision probably was that it highlighted a
new congressional awareness and approval of cogeneration.
B. The Major Element of the Legislative Package. PURPA
In the fourth piece of legislation, the Public Utilities Regulatory
Policy Act (PURPA), Congress attempted to grapple with the regula-
tory barriers to cogeneration which had developed. Congress au-
thorized exemption of both cogeneration and small power
production facilities from most of the onerous licensing require-
ments and regulations imposed under the Federal Power Act (FPA),
PUCHA and the state rules and regulations governing utility rates
and financial organization. At the same time, Congress discouraged
the recalcitrance of some utilities in offering interconnection services
and providing reasonable backup services by requiring that utilities
purchase from, sell to and provide interconnection services to quali-
fying facilities at fair rates.
Congress gave the FERC great flexibility in implementing
PURPA. For example, while defining the term "cogeneration facil-
ity,"6 Congress left to the FERC to determine by rule the require-
ments for a "qualifying cogeneration facility." Congress did,
however, specify that such a facility could not be owned "primarily"
by an electric utility.
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56. Pub. L. No. 95-621, § 206(c)(3) (1978).
57. 45 Fed. Reg., 38080 (1980).
58. Pub. L. No. 95-619, § 302 (1978).
59. Congress authorized $875,000 over a three year period, beginning September 30,
1978. Id
60. 16 U.S.C.A. § 796(18)(A) (West Supp. 1982) defined a "cogeneration facility" as "[a]
facility which produces--(i) electric energy, and (ii) steam or forms of useful energy (such as
heat) which are used for industrial, commercial heating, or cooling purposes." Similar defini-
tions were used in other acts of the 1978 energy legislation.
61. The FERC interpreted "primarily" to mean that electric utilities, public utility hold-
ing companies, or their subsidiaries could not own more than 50 percent of any cogeneration
facility. If an electric utility owned more than 50 percent of a facility, then the facility would
not qualify for PURPA benefits. 45 Fed. Reg. 17959, 17973 (1980). This provision effectively
prevented utilities from having a controlling interest in an operation that might be exempted
from traditional utility regulation.
Congress also extended the FERC's power to order interconnec-
tions to situations in which qualifying cogenerators6 2 wished to buy
power from, or to sell power to, the electric utility.63 The Commis-
sion, however, had to meet certain procedural requirements and to
make certain findings specified by the FPA.6 Congress also added a
new section to Part II of the FPA authorizing the Commission to
order the wheeling65 of power by one electric utility upon applica-
tion of another electric utility or a federal marketing agency.66 The
Conference Report explicitly stated that this provision was included
"to require a third party to provide transmission services between a
willing buyer and a willing seller."67 Before the FERC could order
wheeling, it had to meet certain requirements of the FPA, just as
with interconnection.6"
In section 210 of PURPA,69 Congress authorized the FERC to
establish rules governing electric utilities' sales to and purchases
from qualifying cogenerators. 70 These perhaps were the most novel
provisions relating to cogenerators; never before had the FERC been
asked to regulate a utility's retail rate. Rates for the purchase of
power were required to be "just and reasonable to the electric con-
sumers of the electric utility and in the public interest" as well as
nondiscriminatory against cogenerators. 7 1 In no case were these
rates to exceed the "incremental cost of alternative electric energy"
to the utility.72 Rates for sale of electricity to cogenerators also were
62. Most of these PURPA provisions also apply to small power producers, but most ref-
erences to small power producers are omitted from this article.
63. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824i(a) (West Supp. 1982).
64. In particular, the Commission was to "afford an opportunity for an evidentiary hear-
ing," and make findings that such an order "(i) is in the public interest, (2) would-
(A) encourage overall conservation of energy or capital, (B) optimize the efficiency of use of
facilities and resources, or (C) improve the reliability of any electric utility system or Federal
power marketing agency to which the order applies." 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 834(i)(b)(2), (c) (West
Supp. 1982). Additionally, an interconnection order was not to "result in a reasonably ascer-
tainable uncompensated economic loss for any electric utility [or] qualifying cogenerator,"
"place an undue burden on an electric utility [or] qualifying cogenerator," "unreasonably im-
pair the reliability of any electric utility affected by the order," or "impair the ability of any
electric utility affected by the order to render adequate service to its customers." Id. § 824(k).
65. Wheeling is the process by which an electric utility with surplus power may send
power to an electric utility in need of power over the transmission lines of a third utility.
66. 16 U.S.C.A. § 8240) (West Supp. 1982).
67. H.R. REP. No. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7826.
68. The findings and requirements were similar to those required in the case of intercon-
nection. See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 4824j(a), 824k (West Supp. 1982). However, further requirements
were imposed that required the preservation of "existing competitive relationships." Id.
§ 824j(c).
69. Codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3 (West Supp. 1982).
70. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3(a) (West Supp. 1982).
71. Id. § 824a-3(b).
72. The "incremental cost of alternative electric energy" was defined as "the cost to the
electric utility of the electric energy which, but for the purchase from such cogenerator or small
power producer, such utility would generate or purchase from another source." Id. § 824a-
3(d).
to be just and reasonable, in the public interest and
nondiscriminatory.73
In addition, if found necessary by the FERC, the FERC could
prescribe rules exempting cogenerators in whole or in part from the
PFA, the PUCHA and state utility regulation, with the exception of
the interconnection and wheeling provisions of the FPA and any
state regulations necessary to implement section 210 of PURPA.74
The state regulatory body that had ratemaking authority or, in the
case of a nonregulated utility, the utility itself, was to implement all
of these rules.75
Congress gave the FERC wide discretion in implementing
PURPA's cogeneration provisions, and the Commission took seri-
ously its mandate to encourage cogeneration. In its final rules issued
February 19, 1980,76 for example, the FERC used its discretionary
powers to exempt qualifying cogenerators from the FPA, the
PUCHA and state regulation to the full extent permitted by section
210.
77
Moreover, while section 210(b) stated that the purchase rate of
power from cogenerators should not exceed "the incremental cost to
the utility of alternative electric energy, ' ' 78 the FERC appeared to
mandate this maximum rate as the only purchase rate which should
be offered to new79 cogeneration facilities. The Commission deter-
mined that purchase rates should equal thefull avoided costs of the
utility after consideration of the following factors: The availability of
power from the qualifying facility during daily or seasonal peak load
periods; the reliability of the cogeneration facility; the presence of a
firm contract to supply power; the ability of the facility to coordinate
outages with the utility; the willingness of the facility to accept inter-
ruption of power; and the adaptability of the facility to system emer-
gencies.8" To the extent that the cogenerator could perform these
services, the utility could avoid more costs, and the cogenerator
73. Id § 824a-3(c).
74. Id. § 824a-3(e).
75. Id § 824a-3(f). Subsequent subsections of § 210 dealt with judicial review and en-
forcement, as well as Commission enforcement of the preceding rules and regulations. In
particular, an action could be brought by any person against any electric utility or qualifying
cogenerator who violated any rule implemented by a state pursuant to the rules of the Com-
mission. Id. § 824a-3(g)(2). Alternatively, an electric utility or cogenerator could petition the
Commission to enforce such rules. Id. § 824a-3(h)(2)(B). Judicial review could be obtained of
any proceeding of a state regulatory authority regarding the implementation of section 210
regulations. Id. § 824a-3(g)(l), and the Commission could initiate proceedings against any
state for failure to implement its rules. Id § 824a-3(h)(2)(A).
76. 18 C.F.R. § 292 (1980).
77. Id § 292.601, .602.
78. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3(b) (West 1980).
79. "New" cogeneration facilities were those on which construction commenced after the
enactment of PURPA, November 9, 1978.
80. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e) (1980). The relationship of these factors to purchase rates is
discussed further in 45 Fed. Reg. 12,226-27 (1980).
should be rewarded with a higher purchase rate. States could offer
rates more encouraging to cogeneration,"' but they could not ap-
prove purchase rates at less than full avoided costs unless they deter-
mined that such rates still would encourage cogeneration and meet
the nondiscriminatory tests of PURPA, 2 or unless they obtained a
waiver of the rules from the FERC.83
The factors that the Commission determined should be consid-
ered established two components in avoided cost calculations:
"avoided energy cost" and "avoided capacity cost." If a cogenerator
offered an electric utility power only on an "as available" basis, then
the cogenerator was entitled only to an energy cost credit. The
purchase rate would be based on the incremental cost to the utility of
the last unit of power that otherwise would be necessary for the util-
ity to produce at that time of day.84 Typically, utilities operate their
most expensive generating equipment last when meeting rising de-
mand. Therefore, a cogenerator offering power at times of peak util-
ity demand theoretically would receive a higher purchase rate than
one supplying power in off-peak periods.
If the cogenerator, however, was willing to enter a firm contract
to supply power for a specified time period, then a capacity credit
might be included in the purchase rate. With a reliable power
source, the utility might postpone or even avoid the construction of
an otherwise necessary new plant. In this case, the Commission felt
the cogenerator should receive a payment equal to the costs the util-
ity would have incurred to build or to buy an equivalent amount of
new capacity. 5 An electric utility could avoid this payment, how-
ever, by showing that it had no need for additional capacity or cur-
rently had a capacity surplus.8 6
Regarding sales of power to cogenerators, the FERC deter-
mined that nondiscriminatory rates required that utilities offer
cogenerators the same rates that they offered other customers with
similar load or cost-related characteristics.87 If additional services
were provided, such as backup or maintenance power, 88 the Com-
81. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,221 (1980).
82. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(3) (1980).
83. 18 C.F.R. § 292.403(a) (1980).
84. In effect, the energy cost credit represents the short-run marginal costs avoided by the
utility by the purchase of cogenerated power, that is, variable operation and maintenance and
fuel costs.
85. The capacity credit represents the long-run marginal costs avoided by the utility with
firm purchases of power. It might include payment for the deferral of capital costs, rather than
outright avoidance of new capital costs. See 45 Fed. Reg. 12,225-26 (1980).
86. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,227 (1980).
87. 18 C.F.R. § 292.305 (1980).
88. The FERC defined backup power as power supplied by an electric utility to a facility
during an unscheduled outage of equipment. Maintenance power was defined as power sup-
plied during a scheduled outage. Thus, the two are differentiated by the emergency nature of
the former. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(9), (11).
mission stated that these rates should not be based on the assump-
tion that all qualifying facilities would require this service
simultaneously.89
Additionally, the FERC mandated the simultaneous purchase
and sale of power.9" With simultaneous "buy-and-sell," cogener-
ators did not need to sell surplus electricity only to the utility, but
could sell their total power output at the avoided cost rate and buy
their total power needs at the applicable retail rate. Since most utili-
ties base retail rates on average or embedded costs, the FERC hoped
that this provision would offer a significant economic incentive to
cogenerators whenever rising marginal costs exceeded average costs.
At the same time, the Commission declared that utilities had an
obligation to interconnect with any qualifying facility wishing to
purchase or sell power. 9' An exception was permitted only if an
otherwise unregulated utility became subject to regulation under
Part II of the FPA. While acknowledging that section 210 of
PURPA did not exempt qualifying facilities from the complex inter-
connection provisions of the FPA, the Commission nevertheless ar-
gued that "the obligation to interconnect with a qualifying facility is
subsumed with the requirement of section 210(a) that electric utili-
ties offer to sell electric energy to and purchase electric energy from
qualifying facilities. 92 To hold otherwise would subject qualifying
facilities to these complex and onerous provisions and thus would
negate the mandate to encourage cogeneration. 93
In a second set of rules issued a few weeks later, the Commis-
sion set forth criteria defining "qualifying cogenerator" and "quali-
fying cogeneration facility."94 Again the FERC took its mandate to
encourage cogeneration seriously and established lenient criteria
aimed primarily at preventing abuse of the "qualifying" status. Be-
yond the ownership restriction specified by Congress,95 cogeneration
facilities were required to meet only two other criteria for qualifica-
tion. Topping cycle facilities96 had to meet a minimum operating
standard,97 while oil and gas cogenerators were required to meet an
efficiency standard.98
89. That is, the Commission wished that such rates would take account of the diversity
factor. See supra note 36. If facilities do not all break down simultaneously, then they should
not have to pay a demand charge for breakdown service equal to their aggregate capacity, but
equal only to some fraction thereof.
90. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(4) (1980).
91. Id. § 292.303(c).
92. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,220 (1980).
93. Id. at 12,221.
94. 18 C.F.R. § 292 (1980).
95. See supra notes 18, 62.
96. See supra note 1.
97. At least 5 percent of the total energy output had to be in the form of useful thermal
energy. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205(a)(1) (1980).
98. For a topping cycle facility, the useful power output of the facility plus one-half the
The topping cycle operating standard was included to prevent
someone from gaining qualification by runing a conventional elec-
tricity generating plant and using only a trickle of the waste heat to
gain the benefits of qualifying status. The efficiency standard was
imposed to meet the concerns of those who felt that encouraging oil
and gas cogeneration was counter to other provisions of the National
Energy Act. Thus, the FERC sought a standard that "would ensure
that qualifying facilities product heat and power more efficiently
than a 8500 Btu/kwh combined cycle generating station and a 90
percent efficient process steam boiler."99 If an oil or gas cogenera-
tion facility met such a standard, then it offered some real efficiency
gains over good conventional heat and power production,"o
Pending the outcome of an environmental impact statement,
diesel cogeneration temporarily was excluded from qualifying status.
In June 1981, however, the FERC removed this prohibition and
gave generic qualification to diesel cogeneration.' 0 1 It decided that
while an increased number of cogeneration facilities might cause air
quality to deteriorate and increase acid rainfall, the number attribu-
table directly to PURPA incentives would not be significant.'
0 2
Upon meeting the ownership and relevant operating and effi-
ciency standards, cogenerators could certify themselves as "quali-
fied."' 13 Alternatively, cogenerators could supply some additional
information and apply to be certified as "qualifying" by the Com-
mission." If the Commission wished to deny qualification or to set
a hearing, it was required to do so within 90 days of receiving the
application for qualification. Otherwise, qualifying status was
deemed granted.
These two sets of regulations were seen by most commentators
as a significant step forward in redressing the balance of power be-
tween electric utilities and smaller, independent power producers.0 5
useful thermal energy output during any calendar year had to be no less than 42.5 percent of
the total energy input of natural gas or oil to the facility. If the useful thermal energy output
was less than 15 percent of the total energy output, then the computed efficiency must be no
less than 45 percent. For any bottoming cycle facility using oil or gas for supplementary firing,
the useful power output of the facility had to be no less than 45 percent of the energy input of
the natural gas or oil used for supplementary firing. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205(a)(2) (1980).
99. 45 Fed. Reg. 17,968 (1980).
100. This efficiency standard was also used by the FERC to determine the gas cogener-
ators who should be exempted from the incremental pricing provisions of the NGPA. 18
C.F.R. § 292.205(c) (1980).
101. 46 Fed. Reg. 33,026 (1981).
102. The Commission thought that in the New York area, the high municipal taxes at-
tached to Consolidated Edison's retail rates would be more of an incentive to install cogenera-
tion than the rates available under PURPA. Id at 33,026.
103. 18 C.F.R. § 292.207(a) (1980).
104. Id § 292.207(b).
105. See, e.g., J. Schillaci, The Simultaneous Buy and Sell Provisions of PURPA Section
210 Regulations, 106:8 PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY at 43-45; D. SILVERSTONE, PURPA
PROVISIONS ON COGENERATION AND SMALL POWER PRODUCTION (1980); Alden Meyer, Gen-
The FERC clearly had carried out the congressional mandate to en-
courage cogeneration.
C Subsequent Legislative Initiatives Affecting Cogeneration
Although Congress did register a desire to encourage cogenera-
tion, no tax credits were explicitly offered to would-be cogenerators
in the 1978 energy legislation. Congress remedied this omission in
1980, however, when it added "cogeneration equipment" to the tax
code definition of energy property eligible for the ten percent energy
investment tax credit.10 6 The credit was made available to add-on
property that enabled new cogeneration or increased existing
cogeneration in facilities already existing as of January 1, 1980.107
To receive the credit, oil and gas could only be burned for startup,
backup or flame control.108
In the Biomass Energy and Alcohol Fuel Act of 1980,1°9 Con-
gress made $1,450,000,000 available to approved "biomass energy
projects" and "municipal waste energy projects." t 0 Both types of
projects included cogeneration facilities,"' but priority for financial
assistance was to be given to projects that used a primary fuel other
than oil or gas to produce a biomass fuel, that used new or improved
technologies to expand possible feedstocks or to produce biomass en-
ergy," 2 or that produced a liquified fuel from municipal waste." 3
After the change in administrations in 1981, funding levels were cut
in the bills that permitted grants to cogeneration projects, but these
cuts affected all eligible projects-not just cogeneration.' 14
On the other hand, the Small Business Act was amended to per-
mit the Small Business Administration to make loans for "energy
measures" that included "industrial cogeneration of energy, district
heating, or production of energy from industrial waste."" 5 No re-
strictions were imposed on the fuel sources eligible for this credit.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 extended accelerated cost
erate Your Own: FERC Rules Give Small Power Producers a Break, 6 THE POWERLINE 2
(1980).
106. 26 U.S.C.A. § 48(1), (3), (14) (West Supp. 1982).
107. If a boiler had to be replaced to cogenerate, it was only eligible to the extent that
additional capacity was required for the cogeneration function. Furthermore, the credit was
only available until December 31, 1982, unless part of the project had "a normal construction
period of 2 years or more." In this case, the credit was extended to December 31, 1990, provid-
ing certain interim deadlines were met. 26 U.S.C.A. § 36-46(a) (West Supp. 1982).
108. 26 U.S.C.A. § 48(l)(14) (West Supp. 1982).
109. Pub. L. No. 96-29 (1980).
110. These funds were to be available for a two year period beginning October 1, 1980, or
until expended. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8803(a) (West Supp. 1982).
I11. Id. §8802(5), (15).
112. Id § 8817(a)(1).
113. Id § 8835(a)(1).
114. For example, the funding level of the BIAFA was reduced to $1,170,000,000 in The
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Amendment of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1061 (1J81).
115. Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 1902(a)(12), 1903(g)(5) (1981).
recovery to investments that received an investment tax credit, in-
cluding energy credits."
16
In 1982, a movement began to amend the sections of PURPA
that affected cogeneration. As originally introduced, S. 1885 would
have removed the restriction on utility ownership of qualifying
cogeneration facilities." 7 Numerous witnesses in Senate hearings"
18
testified that, without a clearer congressional mandate ordering in-
terconnection, utilities easily could become unfair competitors with
private cogenerators." 9 Therefore, S.1885 was amended to allow
state regulatory agencies to limit utility ownership of qualifying fa-
cilities and to mandate a streamlined interconnection procedure.
More hearings were held, 20 but this time utility interests opposed
the bill, and the legislative effort died.
While cogeneration intially attracted congressional attention be-
cause it was a "known" technology that promised substantial fuel
savings, Congress did not choose to support this "known" technol-
ogy enthusiastically. Tax credits and financial assistance were not
offered to oil or gas cogeneration, but only to coal-fired or biomass-
fueled cogeneration. Nevertheless, the major incentives for cogener-
ation from this federal package probably came not from the rela-
tively meager appropriations or tax credits offered, but from the
attempt to remove institutional barriers to cogeneration, and this leg-
islation applied to all forms of cogeneration. Certainly if the court
cases that have emerged as the result of this legislation are any indi-
cation, PURPA's section 210 has offered the greatest boost to
cogenerators and the greatest threat to entrenched utility interests.
IV. Court Challenges to the Federal Legislation
The significant court challenges to federal legislation affecting
cogeneration have centered almost exclusively on PURPA. Two
cases are prominent because of their wideranging implications for
both independent cogenerators and the electric utility industry:
FERC v. Mississipi12' and American Electric Power v. FERC.
12 2
116. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 211 (1981).
117. See supra note 61 and accompanying text for ownership restrictions.
118. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Energy Regulation of the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources on S. 1885-Part I, S.R. REP. No. 1885, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing, Part I].
119. In the interim period, the District of Columbia Circuit Court had overturned the
FERC's interconnection rule, thus throwing the ability of qualifying facilities to obtain con-
nection to the electric utility's grid into doubt. See supra text accompanying notes 156-57.
120. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Energy Regulation of the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources on Amendment No. 1452 to S. 1885-Part II, S. REP. No. 1885, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings Part II].
121. FERC v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982).
122. American Paper Institute, Inc. v. American Electric Power Service Corp., 51
U.S.L.W. 4547 (1983); American Electric Power v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1226 (1982).
While industry has mounted numerous challenges to the imple-
mentation of the fuel use restrictions in the FUA, these cases have
not received much attention. Frequent changes in DOE's regula-
tions 123 have made it difficult, if not impossible, to sustain a major
court challenge. Moreover, requirements for obtaining a cogenera-
tion exemption have been somewhat eased, 24 and potential cogener-
ators will not necessarily be involved in any future litigation.
A. The Mississippi Case
In April 1979, the State of Mississippi and the Mississippi Pub-
lic Service Commission commenced an action against the FERC and
claimed that Titles I and III and section 210 of Title II of PURPA
should be declared unconstitutional. Mississippi maintained that
Congress had exceeded its commerce clause power and that PURPA
was an invastion of state sovereignty in violation of the tenth
amendment. 
25
The district court, in an unreported opinion, agreed with the
State that Congress had exceeded its power under the commerce
clause. The court noted that public electric utilities were not even in
existence at the time of the writing of the Constitution and that the
legislation was "a clear usurpation of the power and authority which
the United States simply does not have under the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution." 26 The court went on to conclude that PURPA
also violated state sovereignty. Relying on National League of Cities
123. To illustrate the frequency of changes in the FUA regulations, the following brief
history is offered: Interim rules, issued in 1979 in 44 Fed. Reg. 28,594, 36,002, 43,176 (1980),
were challenged almost immediately by both utilities and industry. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit consolidated these cases for review and then held them in
abeyance pending the issuance of final rules. Final rules were issued piecemeal in June, Au-
gust and December 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 38,276, 38,302, 53,682, 84,967 (1980). With the change
of administration, however, came the suspension and re-evaluation of most major regulations
promulgated at the end of the Carter administration. New final rules subsequently were issued
in December 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,872 (1981), and then modified in still later rulings, e.g., 47
Fed. Reg. 15,311, 17,037 (1982). For a more complete early history of the FUA and the restric-
tions imposed, see Irwin & Sisk, The Fuel Use Act and DOE's Regulations, 29 U. KAN. L. REV.
319-36 (1981).
124. Regulations for obtaining the cogeneration exemption were first proposed in August
1980 in 45 Fed. Reg. 53,368 (1980). No further action was taken on these rules, however, until
the Reagan administration adopted them, substantially as proposed by the previous adminis-
tration, in December 1981 in 46 Fed. Reg. 59,872 (1981). At this time the Department of
Energy noted, "DOE received many comments and expressions of concern about the failure to
expeditiously proceed with the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding cogeneration or,
alternatively, to propose and adopt a less onerous standard for applying for and obtaining the
permanent cogeneration exemption." The Department went on to say it was "considering
several alternatives to simplify these provisions." Id. at 59,882. This it ultimately did in final
rules issued July 6, 1982. 47 Fed. Reg. 29,209 (1982).
125. The commerce clause of the United States Constitution states that Congress shall
have the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes." The tenth amendment states, "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. art. Ill, amend. X.
126. 102 S. Ct. 2126, 2134 (1982).
v. Usery,12 1 the court declared the PURPA provisions void because
they constituted "a direct intrusion on integral and traditional func-
tions of the State of Mississippi.'
' 28
The FERC and the Secretary of Energy appealed this decision
directly to the Supreme Court, and in a split decision issued in June
1982, the high Court reversed the decision of the lower court. Re-
garding the commerce clause, the entire Court felt that the lower
court's decision was without merit. Justice Blackmun, writing for
the majority, declared that "it is difficult to conceive of a more basic
element of interstate commerce than electric energy,"' 129 and noted
that utilities in Mississippi itself bought electricity from other states
for retail sales to their consumers and provided similar service in
return.
Justice Blackmun also noted that there was ample evidence
presented in congressional hearings to show that promoting energy
conservation and efficiency would help alleviate the nation's grave
energy situation. Even if PURPA would not significantly improve
the nation's energy situation, "[ilt is sufficient that Congress was not
irrational in concluding that limited federal regulation of retail sales
of electricity and natural gas, and of relationships between cogener-
ators and electric utilities, was essential to protect interstate
commerce."13
0
The Court found the tenth amendment challenge to be "novel."
Section 210 required the states to enforce standards promulgated by
the FERC, while Titles I and III directed the states to consider spe-
cific rate-making standards and imposed certain procedural require-
ments. The majority of the Court upheld Titles I and III on tenth
amendment grounds by noting that these titles merely required the
consideration of federal standards. "There [was] nothing in PURPA
'directly compelling' the States to enact a legislative program.' ' 131
Moreover, since the regulation of electricity was preemptible under
the commerce clause, federal law "necessarily controls," even if it is
executed in a manner that is "extraordinarily intrusive."'
' 3 2
The majority acknowledged that, superficially, section 210 was
127. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
128. 102 S. Ct. 2126, 2134 (1982).
129. Id at 2136.
130. Id. This holding applied a standard that the Court had just reiterated in the previous
term in Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981), that "legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and
benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality. . . . A
court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that
there is no rational basis for a Congressional finding that the regulated activity affects inter-
state commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means se-
lected and the asserted ends." Id. at 2134.
131. 1d at 2140.
132. Id. at 2141.
the "most intrusive of PURPA's provisions."' 33 The majority also
thought, however, that section 210's constitutionality was the easiest
to resolve. This section exempted qualified facilities from state laws
and regulation and thus did nothing more than "pre-empt conflicting
state enactments in the traditional way." 34 Because of its commerce
clause powers, Congress could have chosen to regulate retail sales of
electricity completely.
While the requirement that states implement the buy-and-sell
rule for all utilities over which they had ratemaking authority was
more troublesome, one way states could do this was by "an under-
taking to resolve disputes between qualifying facilities and electric
utilities arising under [PURPAI."'' 5 This, the Court noted, was pre-
cisely the kind of activity in which the Mississippi Public Service
Commission customarily engaged. Moreover, since state courts are
required to enforce federal law, the Mississippi Commission had ju-
risdiction to enforce section 210.136
The two partial dissents 37 supported the substantive provisions
of PURPA that related to cogeneration facilities. 138  Justice
O'Connor specifically noted her concurrence with the majority's de-
cision to uphold section 210 of PURPA. 39 While the rules requiring
state implementation were "distrubing," Justice O'Connor agreed
that states might "satisfy § 210's implementation requirement simply
by adjudicating private disputes arising under that section."'
140
While she thought there might be "hidden constitutional defects" in
section 210, these could only be considered in a "concrete contro-
versy" and should not preclude accepting section 210 as constitu-
tional at that time.
Thus, the power of Congress to legislate retail electricity rates
and to exempt certain forms of power production from state and fed-
eral regulation appears to have been upheld unanimously. If the
federal law may be implemented by states simply through adjudicat-
ing private disputes, the Court is willing to let federal imposition of
state implementation stand. Only when federal laws impose more
extensive administrative and judicial requirements on states do the
133. Id at 2137.
134. Id
135. Id. (quoting 18 C.F.R. § 292.401(a) (1980)).
136. The Court cited Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), as controlling on this point. Id. at
2137.
137. Justice Powell and Justice O'Connor, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist concurred, both wrote partial dissents.
138. Justice Powell objected to some of the procedural provisions of section 210 of
PURPA, saying that they intruded on core areas of a state's administrative and judicial proce-
dure. Id. at 2144.
139. Id at 2146. Justice O'Connor's dissent focused on the Court's tenth amendment
analysis of the constitutionality of Titles I and III of PURPA.
140. Id.
Court's opinions become divisive. Regarding PURPA's section 210,
the mandate for states to continue establishing avoided cost rates for
cogenerators was quite clear.
B. The American Electric Power Case
The American Electric Power (AEP) case arose out of a chal-
lenge by three utilities' to the FERC's final rules implementing
PURPA. The utilities specifically challenged the "full avoided cost"
rule, t4 the "simultaneous buy-and-sell provision," "3 the blanket au-
thority granted to cogenerators to interconnect'" and the lack of
"fuel use" criteria in determining "qualifying" cogenerators. 1
5
In analyzing the "full avoided cost" rule, the appeals court held
that the FERC had not adequately considered the provision that
purchase rates be "just and reasonable to the electric consumers of
the electric utility and in the public interest." 4 6 The court stipulated
that the FERC must demonstrate the "factual basis" for its claim
that setting purchase rates at less than full avoided costs would result
in insignificant savings for consumers. The court agreed that the
commission could not adopt a "split-the-savings" approach to
ratemaking, since this would subject cogenerators to precisely the
kind of scrutiny that PURPA was meant to avoid. The court never-
theless felt that alternatives such as "some percentage of avoided
costs" could have been examined. Such an approach, the court as-
serted, "would not necessarily require any inquiry into the cogener-
ator's costs, but only into those of the utility.' '7 Thus, the court
asked the commission to take a "harder look" at this alternative.
The court endeavored to demonstrate that payment of full
avoided costs to cogenerators might not always be in the public in-
terest and that some cogeneration might be induced at less than full
avoided costs. 148 Nonetheless the court ignored the factors that the
141. American Electric Power Service Corporation, Consolidated Edison Company of
New York, and Colorado-Ute Electric Association were the petitioners.
142. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(2)-(4) (1980). See supra note 20.
143. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(4) (1980). See also supra note 22.
144. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(c)(1) (1980). See also supra note 22.
145. Fuel use criteria restrict qualification to facilities burning specified fuels. There was
nothing in the statute specifically requiring the FERC to include fuel use criteria when qualify-
ing cogenerators.
146. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3(b)(l) (West Supp. 1982).
147. 675 F.2d 1226, 1234 (1982).
148. For example, the court offered some hypothetical cases in which payment of full-
avoided costs might not be in the public interest--such as pollution control standards or taxes
making the utility's avoided costs higher than the cogenerator's. Yet, this was precisely the
type of incentive Congress was trying to make available to cogenerators to encourage more
efficient use of energy, since the utility, by definition, would have had to pay the higher costs
anyway. The court also argued that if a utility had excess capacity, then paying full-avoided
costs to cogenerators would result in higher costs for other customers of the utility because
there would be fewer purchased kilowatt-hours over which the utility could spread its fixed
costs. In this same decision, however, the court was upholding the simultaneous buy-and-sell
FERC declared should be considered in setting purchase rates for
power, 149 factors that already appeared to encourage the setting of a
range of avoided cost rates dependent on the cogenerator's charac-
teristics. The court also did not recognize that the FERC had per-
mitted voluntary purchase agreements to be set at less than full
avoided cost rates. 50 One state commission, commenting on this de-
cision, noted that a number of utilities and cogenerators already had
made contracts with less than full avoided cost payments.
15
Almost as an afterthought, the court added that this discussion
assumed "that the utilities, as well as the cogenerators, are subject to
some competitive restraints" and that if utilities were found to be
monopsonists, then the commission's present rate might be justified.
If, indeed, the commission had made this determination, it should
have so stated.'52 Because the court already had noted the utility
abuses that had prompted the enactment of section 210 of
PURPA, 53 and cogenerators still were limited by PURPA to selling
power wholesale only to utilities, 154 it is difficult to understand the
court's willingness to assume these restraints.
Having thus vacated the FERC's full avoided cost rule, the
court then upheld the FERC's simultaneous buy-and-sell provision
and supported the decision record as adequate. The court termed it
"anomalous" to treat the cogenerator that sells all its power differ-
ently from one that sells only surplus power. Once again the court
noted the unwillingness of utilities to purchase power at an appropri-
ate rate from cogenerators prior to PURPA and stated that "[u]nder
these circumstances we are inclined to give a great deal of deference
to FERC's regulations."'
55
Acting upon the utilities' third challenge, the court vacated the
FERC's interconnection rule. Here the court noted, "By requiring
'any' utility to make interconnections with 'any' cogenerator FERC
designates, the commission would in effect exempt qualifying
cogenerators from the other procedural and substantive require-
ments. . . [of] FPA sections 210 and 212, and deprive utilities of the
safeguards afforded by those provisions. ' 56 This contravened the
rule, and under this scheme the utility is not losing any purchased kilowatt-hours because the
cogenerator is still purchasing all power needs from the utility.
149. These are the factors, like cogenerator reliability and usefulness of energy produced
that are set forth in 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e)(2) (1980). See supra note 20.
150. 18 C.F.R. § 292.301(b) (1980).
151. In re Cogeneration and Small Power Production, 47 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 327
(Me. 1982).
152. 675 F.2d 1226, 1236.
153. Id. at 1230-31.
154. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3(a) (West Supp. 1982).
155. 675 F.2d 1226, 1238.
156. Id. at 1239.
prohibition in section 210(e)(3)' 7 of exemption from the intercon-
nection provisions of the FPA.
In response to the FERC's arguments that compliance with the
literal meaning of the statute would place an "undue burden" on
cogenerators 'and would restrict its mandate to encourage cogenera-
tion, the court suggested that the commission adopt "streamlined
procedures." The court noted that a general grant of authority to
encourage cogeneration did not permit the FERC "to consign de-
tailed provisions of PURPA itself to the wastebasket as meaningless
surplusage."' 58 If streamlined provisions were still too burdensome,
then "the necessary amendment must come from Congress."' 59
Finally, the court upheld the commission's decision not to in-
clude any fuel use criteria in the definition of a qualifying cogenera-
tion facility. The court agreed that congressional use of the term
"may" and not "must" demonstrated that inclusion of such criteria
was not mandatory. Furthermore, Congress already had offered the
possibility of exemption from the Fuel Use Act to large cogener-
ators; 16 thus, Congress apparently did not wish that small facilities
be restricted in their use of oil and gas simply by becoming cogener-
ators. Efficiency in the allocation and use of the nation's electric en-
ergy supplies, rather than conservation of oil and gas, was the
principle reason for the passage of PURPA. The court again stated
its deference to the commission and held that the commission gave
reasoned and adequate consideration to its regulations.
Thus, the appeals court vacated two of the FERC's rules, the
full-avoided cost rule and the blanket authority to interconnect, and
upheld two other rules, the right of cogenerators simultaneously to
buy and sell power and the rejection of a fuel use criteria for qualifi-
cation. Upon the issuance of this decision, the FERC, with the sup-
port of the American Paper Institute, petitioned for a rehearing by
the court en banc. The petition circulated to the full court, and a
rehearing was denied. 161 In a "highly unusual" move, 162 the original
panel subsequently issued a memorandum explaining its decision,
157. See supra note 64 and accompanying text for a discussion of FPA provisions. Specif-
ically, § 2 10(e)(3)(B) said that no qualifying facility could be exempted from "the provisions of
section 210 . . . or 212 of the Federal Power Act or the necessary authorities for enforcement
of any such provision under the Federal Power Act ....
158. 675 F.2d 1226, 1240.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
161. Only five of the eleven judges of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
voted on the petition. Of these five, three were on the original panel and voted to deny the
rehearing. The other two voted to grant the rehearing. The remaining six did not participate
in the decision.
162. Nowak, Contract Negotiations under PURPA and the Import of Recent Developments
in Transactions Between Electric Utilities and Cogeneration and Small Power Production Facili-
ties, 3 ENERGY L.J. 273, 283 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Nowak].
and the dissenting judges issued a strong statement of dissent.' 63
Upon denial of the request for rehearing, the FERC and the
American Paper Institute petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari, which was granted in October 1982. The order to the cir-
cuit court was stayed, pending the outcome of the Supreme Court
decision.
Between January 1982, when the circuit court first issued its
opinion, and June 1983, when the Supreme Court finally stated its
decision, the AEP case caused great consternation for both the
FERC and potential cogenerators. The chairman of the FERC,
C.M. Butler, stated that, if the Supreme Court upheld the circuit
court and thus required a full consideration of market forces and a
substantial evidence standard of review, then a complete review of
the avoided cost rule could take one to two years. 164  Moreover,
states that had passed "mini-PUPRAs" of their own could expect
that their rate-making and interconnection orders also would be
challenged.
If the interconnection order was upheld, then the FERC would
be required to issue notices for interconnection and to conduct a full
evidentiary hearing. The entire process could take three to four
years. 165 Moreover, the commission necessarily would make some
contradictory findings. 166 Thus, the process could become prohibi-
tively expensive and time consuming for cogenerators seeking to ob-
tain utility hook-ups.
167
Furthermore, cogenerators were uncertain about state commis-
sions' reactions to the potential vacation of the full avoided cost rule.
163. The two judges who supported a rehearing thought the panel had erroneously ap-
plied a heightened standard of review to the full-avoided cost rule and that the FERC had not
acted arbitrarily and capriciously. They also found the interconnection ruling "troublesome,"
and thought that the "[FERC's] alternative reading should receive a closer scrutiny by this
court before it erects a formidable, perhaps insurmountable, roadblock to a major energy pro-
gram." 675 F.2d 1226, 1247.
The panel may have been somewhat taken aback by the harsh interpretation put on their
ruling by both the FERC and the two dissenting judges. In its supporting memorandum, the
panel expressed the need to restate "the essence of the court's decision" in light of "the distor-
tions . . . served up in the petition for rehearing. . . .' It stated that it had not struck down
the full-avoided cost rule, but merely required the Commission "to explain its rationale and
process of consideration." It then went on to say that, with respect to the interconnection issue,
the court had not been unsympathetic to the FERC's aims, but "a court is not the proper
forum to repair a congressional product that may have been less than fully considered." 'Id at
1246.
164. Senate Hearings Part I, supra note 118, at 229.
165. Id. at 236-37.
166. For example, according to the provisions in the FPA, the Commission would have to
find that interconnection would encourage the overall conservation of energy, but not result in
a "reasonably ascertainable uncompensated economic loss for any electric utility or qualifying
cogenerator." See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
167. As the result of the testimony of Chairman Butler and others, S.1885 was amended to
strengthen the FERC's power to order interconnections without following the procedures spec-
ified by the FPA. However, as already noted, this legislation did not reach the floor of the
Senate. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
Some states already had delayed action on implementing section 210
rules while awaiting the outcome of the Mississippi case;168 the AEP
circuit court decision gave new cause for delay. Although only a few
states which had section 210 rules in place reviewed these rules in
light of the AEP decision, none vacated their rules. Of those that
then did not have rules in place, a number adopted a "go slow" atti-
tude, pending the outcome of the AEP case. 169 Kansas, for example,
based purchase rates on embedded costs rather than on incremental
costs because, the AEP decision would require rates based on full
avoided costs to be reset after the high Court's decision-an undesir-
able situation for would-be investors. 1
70
Despite the uncertainty among commentators,'"" the Supreme
Court unanimously upheld the FERC's decision. 72 The Court held
that the FERC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in promulgat-
ing the full-avoided cost rule. 173 Because both a waiver of the full-
avoided cost rule174 and the opportunity to negotiate a contract at
less than full-avoided cost 175 were available, "it was not unreasona-
ble for the Commission to prescribe the maximum rate authorized
by PURPA."'
176
In upholding the FERC's interconnection rule, the Court deter-
mined that the section 210(a) authority 177 of the FERC to promul-
gate any rules necessary to complete sales and purchases of power
between qualifying facilities and utilities included the power to order
interconnections. Interconnection was essential to consummating
the sales and purchases of power mandated by the PURPA. The
FERC was correct to interpret section 210(e)(3) 7 8 "as forbidding
[the] FERC to exempt qualifying facilities from being the 'target' of
168. Georgia, Mississippi and West Virginia all acknowledged suspending § 210 proceed-
ings while awaiting the outcome of the Mississippi case. Energy User's News, Apr. 5, 1982, 19-
22.
169. Arkansas, Kansas, Mississippi, New York and West Virginia all appear to have taken
the "go slow" approach pending the outcome of the AEP case. Energy User News, Apr. 5,
1982, 21; id May 23, 1983, at 16; Order on Cogeneration and Small Power Production (Kansas),
in THE APPROPRIATENESS AND FEASIBILITY OF VARIOUS METHODS OF CALCULATING
AVOIDED COSTS. B-141 (1982) (Draft Document, National Regulatory Research Institute
[hereinafter cited as NRRI Draft].
170. Id
171. One commentator called the interconnection issue a "close one." Nowak, supra note
162, at 288.
172. Justice Powell did not participate in the decision.
173. 51 U.S.L.W. 4547 (1983).
174. 18 C.F.R. § 292.403 (1980).
175. Id. § 301(b)(l).
176. 51 U.S.L.W. 4547, 4550.
177. Section 210(a) grants the Commission authority to promulgate "such rules as it deter-
mines necessary to encourage cogeneration and small power production which rules require
electric utilities to offer to--(I) sell electric energy to qualifying cogeneration facilities . . . and
(2) purchase electric energy from such facilities." See 16 U.S.C.A. § 824-3(a) (West Supp.
1982).
178. See supra note 157.
interconnection applications by other facilities under the FPA, but
not as forbidding FERC to grant qualifying facilities the right to ob-
tain interconnections under PURPA without applying for an order
under the FPA."' 79 The Court noted that, to uphold the FERC rule,
it only needed to find that the FERC's interpretation was a reason-
able interpretation, and not that it was the only reasonable
interpretation. 8 o
Apparently the major court challenges to the PURPA provi-
sions relating to cogenerators are over. Both the constitutionality of
the law and the reasonableness of the Commission's rules enacting
the law have been upheld. It is difficult to foresee any further chal-
lenges that states or utilities could mount on the federal level. After
nearly six years of uncertainty, the federal mandate to encourage
cogeneration has been upheld. A remaining question is whether the
states diligently have pursued this federal mandate.
V. State Implementation of PURPA
The FERC gave the states one year to implement the section
210 rules and regulations. By the March 20, 1981 deadline, however,
only sixteen states had final rules in place, 8 ' and some of these still
had to establish purchase rates based on their final rules. Five other
states had reversed the process and had established temporary
purchase rates, pending the outcome of final proceedings. 
82 Most of
the other states appeared to have proceedings pending. Initial delays
apparently were not caused by recalcitrance, but by delayed starts in
initiating proceedings, unanticipated difficulties in calculating
avoided costs and limited resources for the cogeneration proceeding
because of other administrative burdens.' 83 With the success of the
Mississippi challenge to PURPA in the lower court, though, several
states suspended proceedings to await the outcome of the Supreme
Court's decision on PURPA's constitutionality.
84
Nevertheless, by March 1982, only fourteen states did not have
final rules in place. Thirty states had final rates in effect, and an-
other half dozen were nearing implementation. 85 In June, the
Supreme Court upheld PURPA's constitutionality, which meant that
those states that had suspended proceedings once again were com-
pelled to initiate action on section 210. The District of Columbia
179. 51 U.S.L.W. 4547.
180. Id at 4552.
181. State's Cogeneration Rate-Setting Under PURPA, Energy User News, Apr. 20, 1981,
13-14.
182. Id.
183. States Move on Small Power, Cogeneration, 16 POWERLINE, no. 9.
184. See supra note 168.
185. States Cogeneration Rate-Setting Under PURP,4, Energy User News, Apr. 5, 1982,
19.
Circuit Court had rendered its decision on FERC's avoided cost
rules in the interim, however, and state commissions still had cause
to proceed slowly with section 210 implementation.186 As a result of
the uncertainty created by the two court decisions, six states and the
District of Columbia still did not have final rules or rates established
in March 1983, two years after the FERC mandated deadline and
over four years after the passage of PURPA.8 7
A. State Proceedings on Section 210
While giving the states a great deal of flexibility in implemena-
tion, the FERC's rules also placed a number of responsibilities on
state public service commissions. Of greatest importance to most in-
terested parties was the requirement that the state commissions set
standard purchase rates for small cogenerators, those with a generat-
ing capacity of less than 100 kilowatts, 8 8 and establish a method of
purchase from larger qualifying facilities.8 9 PURPA also required
the state commissions to set the rates or means of sale by utilities to
cogenerators of supplementary, backup, maintenance and inter-
ruptible power. 9 ° Additionally, the state commissions were re-
quired to set the conditions of interconnection including the
operational standards required' 9 ' and the costs to be borne by the
cogenerator. 9 2 Finally, the state commissions had to establish data
filing requirements that would permit the would-be cogenerator to
determine or verify the avoided costs likely to be paid by the
utility. 193
In their initial orders, only a few states addressed the issues of
sale of power to cogenerators or establishment of guidelines for in-
terconnection. Most states concentrated almost entirely on establish-
ing the methods for determining utility avoided costs and the rates
for purchase of power by utilities from qualifying facilities (QFs). In
pursuing this task, state commissions adopted diverse approaches to
the task most of them pursued, the establishment of purchase rates
based on avoided costs.
186. See supra note 169.
187. Questions andAnswers, Energy User News, Mar. 7, 1983, 2.
188. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(c) (1980).
189. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3(f) (West Supp. 1982).
190. See supra note 88 for definition of backup and maintenance power. The FERC de-
fined interruptible power as "energy or capacity supplied by an electric utility subject to inter-
ruption by the electric utility under specified conditions." 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(10) (1980).
Supplementary power was defined as "energy or capacity supplied by an electric utility, regu-
larly used by a qualifying facility in addition to that which the facility generates itself." Id.
§ 292.101(8) (1980). For the general obligation to provide such rates, see id § 292.305(b)
(1980).
191. Id § 292.308 (1980).
192. Id § 292.306 (1980).
193. Id § 292.302(b) (1980).
B. State Approaches To Setting Purchase Rates
Traditionally, utility rates have been based on average or em-
bedded costs. Although numerous commentators have noticed a ris-
ing marginal cost curve for the electric utility industry in recent
years, 194 few state commissions studied marginal pricing concepts
until PURPA mandated a review of rates based on these princi-
ples.' 95 Thus, most state commissions required to set rates for self-
generators based on the incremental costs avoided by the utility from
such purchases were completely unfamiliar with the procedures to
carry out this mandate. 196 Moreover, since all these states simultane-
ously were initiating procedures to establish these rates, no state
could model its laws after the laws of another state. 
19 7
Theoretically, to set avoided cost rates one must calculate a util-
ity's costs before any purchases of power from qualifying facilities.
Then the costs must be calculated after allowing for purchases from
these facilities. The difference between these two figures is prorated
among all facilities supplying power to the utility. Commissions im-
mediately discovered that this system of calculation hid numerous
complexities. Not only do the numerous projections and hypotheses
of the analytical model make commission verification of allowed
costs difficult, but the various factors that the FERC mandated com-
missions to consider when setting purchase rates'98 implied that
commissions might have to set a variety of purchase rates. Even the
FERC noted that "the translation of the principle of avoided capac-
ity costs from theory into practice is an extremely difficult
exercise."1 99
While a utility might purchase 100 MW of cogenerated power,
only 50 MW of this power might flow into the grid at the time of day
when high demand requires the burning of expensive oil or the use
of inefficient old plants. Moreover, of this 50 MW production, only
194. See, e.g., A. Thompson, The Strategic Dilemma of Electric Utilities-Part 1 109 PUB-
LIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY 19, 19-28 (Mar. 18, 1982); A. Aim & D. Dreyfus, Utilities in Cri-
sis: A Problem in Governance, Forum Sponsored by the Committee on Energy of the Aspen
Institute for Humanistic Studies, July 16, 1981, New York, Aspen Institute for Humanistic
Studies, 1982, cited in Senate Hearing, Part , supra note 118; J. Pace & J. Landon, Introducing
Competition Into the Electric Utility Industry: An Economic Appraisal, 3 ENERGY L.J. 1 (1982);
W. Primeaux, Jr., Some Problems with Natural Monopoly, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 63, 68-85
(1979).
195. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d) (West Supp. 1982).
196. The Utah Public Service Commission, for example, conceded that "[tihe concept of
avoided-cost based rates is new to this Commission and [presents] difficulties that are yet to be
satisfactorily resolved." In re Implementation of Rules Governing Cogeneration and Small
Power Production in the State of Utah, in NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-364.
197. The Idaho Public Utility Commission noted that "we are writing on a clean slate
with little guidance from other commissions around the country." Rulemaking Proceeding for
Consideration of Cogeneration and Small Power Production, 40 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
563, 565 (1981).
198. Supra note 20.
199. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,226 (1980).
25 MW might be committed to the grid on long-term contract. Com-
missions, therefore, grappled with questions like the following: How
much more valuable is available power at peak hours than at off-
peak hours? Is it necessary to know a utility's avoided costs and a
self-generator's supply pattern on an hourly basis, or would such
regulation place an undue transactional burden on all parties?
Should QFs supplying the 25 MW of long-term power be entitled to
higher rates because the utility can depend on their capacity in sys-
tem planning, or, since all QFs are not likely to cease production
simultaneously, is it possible to assign some capacity value to non-
contractual power in system planning? The manner in which com-
missions resolved these and a myriad of other issues greatly affected
the final purchase rates and the resultant incentive for cogeneration.
Some states, believing either that self-generated power was
likely to be an insignificant source of power for their utilities or that
specifying detailed retail rates or methodologies was not an appro-
priate commission activity, did little more than restate the PURPA
guidelines in their orders. These states left the development of ap-
propriate methodologies and rates to utility discretion.2°° This ap-
proach avoided the thorny issues raised by avoided-cost ratemaking.
Other states, however, took the PURPA mandate seriously and
promulgated lengthy orders detailing the procedures to be followed
in setting purchase rates.2° ' Some held extensive hearings on rates
proposed for cogenerators by jurisdictional utilities.20 2  In all,
twenty-two states203 decided to direct the procedures used by juris-
dictional utilities in the establishment of purchase rates.
1. The Energy Credit.-The most common methodology pre-
scribed by state commissions for determining avoided fuel costs has
been termed the "incremental heat rate approach." 2" This method
involves estimating the heat rate of a certain increment of system
load 205 and then multiplying this figure by the cost of the fuel re-
200. See, e.g., 4 Mo. ADMIN. CODE 240-20.060 (1982); WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 480-105
(1982).
201. See, e.g., Rulemaking Proceeding for Consideration of Cogeneration and Small
Power Production, 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 352 (Idaho 1981); 40 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 563 (Idaho 1981) (same case); See also In re Idaho Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Reg. 4th
(PUR) 160 (Idaho 1981); In re Cogeneration and Small Power Production, 42 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 536 (Me. 1981); 47 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 327 (Me. 1982) (same case).
202. See, e.g., In re Cogeneration and Small Power Production, 48 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 465 (Mich. 1982); In re Consolidated Edison Company of New York, 48 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 94 (N.Y. 1982).
203. The twenty-two states are: California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont and
Virginia.
204. See NRRI Report, The Appropriateness and Feasibility of Various Methods of Calcu-
lating Avoided Costs, 85 (June 1982) [hereinafter cited as NRRI Report].
205. The heat rate indicates the amount of energy (in British thermal units) required to
quired to produce these BTUs. Thus, at a time of day when system
load requires only modern baseload plants fueled by coal or ura-
nium, the energy cost of a kilowatt of electricity is quite low.
20 6
When inefficient older plants, peaking plants or oil-fired plants must
come on line, fuel costs rise considerably.20 7
The final value assigned as avoided fuel cost, however, depends
on a number of variables commissions may or may not leave to util-
ity discretion. One such variable is the size of the incremental block
that is used for determining heat rates and fuel costs. The FERC
guidelines stated that a utility may use an incremental block of 100
MW or 10 percent of system load, whichever is less.208 Some com-
missions, however, made the incremental block much smaller,
20 9
which theoretically should have increased the avoided cost payment
to cogenerators.21 °
A variation on the incremental approach mandated by some
commissions involved the use of system lambda 21' data and produc-
tion cost models. The Florida PSC mandated that utilities use a pro-
duction cost model to isolate the last 1 MW of power produced and
calculated its estimated costs on an hourly basis. Initial payments to
QFs would be based on these estimates, but payments later would be
adjusted according to the real time costs reported in system lambda
data.212 The Massachusetts DPU also mandated use of a production
produce a kilowatt-hour of electricity. The heat rate can vary considerably depending on the
efficiency of the generating units in operation.
206. Florida Power and Light estimated its fuel costs to be 4.46 mills/kwh for a nuclear
power plant in 1981. MOODY'S PUBLIC UTILITY MANUAL 730 (1982).
207. Florida Power and Light estimated its fuel costs to be 46.28 mills/kwh for oil gener-
ating units and 52.36 mills/kwh for gas turbine peaking units in 1981. Id
208. 18 C.F.R. § 292.301(b)(1) (1980).
209. Rhode Island, for example mandated a block representing a I percent decrement in
system load, while Maine required the use of 10 or 50 MW blocks, depending on the size of the
utility. In re Cogeneration and Small Power Production, 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 609,
614 (R.I. 198 1); In re Cogeneration and Small Power Production, 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
536, 540 (Me. 1981).
The Massachusetts DPU, however, noting that theory does not always mirror reality, re-
quired utilities to calculate avoided costs for both 10 and 20 percent decrements in system load
and then to base rates on the larger of the two incremental costs figures thus obtained. Analy-
sis of the Rules Promulgated by the Department of Public Utilities Governing the Sales of
Electricity by Small Power Producers and Cogenerators to Utilities and the Sales of Electricity
by Utilities to Small Power Producers and Cogenerators, NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-
177.
210. If the electric utility's last ten MWs of power is generated by a gas turbine unit with a
fuel cost of 52 mills/kwh, then this would be the avoided energy cost payable to cogenerators if
the incremental block chosen was also 10 MW. See supra note 204. If, however, the previous
90 MW had been generated by coal at a cost of 12 mills/kwh and the incremental block chosen
was 100 MW, then the avoided energy cost payable to cogenerators would be .9(12) + .1(52) =
16 mills/kwh.
211. System lambda is the cost of the next MWh to be produced and delivered to the grid,
or, the marginal running cost of the utility. Typically, utilities dispatch units to minimize
system lambda. To do this, they estimate system lambdas for each hour of the day throughout
the year.
212. In re Cogeneration and Small Power Production, 47 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 281,
284 (1982).
cost model. In Massachusetts' case, however, payments to cogener-
ators were based on theprojected savings to the utility rather than on
real time running costs as in Florida." 3
Instead of specifying an incremental block, the Oklahoma and
North Carolina commissions ordered the use of system lambda
curves to determine which generating unit the utility next should
bring on line. 1 4 Energy costs then were calculated on the basis of
the fuel and variable operating costs of this plant. In pursuing this
"marginal unit" approach, a commission could authorize the use of
the energy costs of the last unit already brought on line or the costs
of the next unit to be brought on line. Choosing the last unit already
on line would benefit ratepayers, but choosing the next unit to come
on line would encourage more cogeneration.
If a production costing model was not used, then a suitable
value was required to be ascertained for the fuel cost applicable to
the incremental heat rate. Since fuel costs are the major component
of the energy credit, they also were an important variable in estab-
lishing the final purchase rate. The California PUC, for example,
decided that, since California utilities burned oil extensively,21 5 the
appropriate measure of avoided fuel costs was the estimated or pro-
jected cost of low sulfur fuel oil.2 16 Although Connecticut's utilities
also burned oil extensively, 217 the Connecticut DPUC mandated the
use of the historical, average fossil fuel cost as determined over the
previous twelve month period.2" Not surprisingly, Connecticut's
approach resulted in a fuel credit lower than California's.
219
213. NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-176.
214. North Carolina chose to use an elaborate production model that calculated system
lambda on an hourly bases throughout the year. The commission then pro-rated these costs to
obtain purchase rates covering daily and seasonal off-peak and on-peak periods. Findings of
fact and pursuant evidence and conclusions of the North Carolina Utilities Commission with re-
spect to rates for cogeneratedpower, in NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-240.
The Oklahoma commission in its interim order chose merely to specify that the energy
component of the avoided cost payment should be based on the cost per kilowatt-hour of
energy generated by the next generating unit to be brought on line. See NRRI Draft, supra
note 169, at 17.
215. One survey showed the aggregate fuel composition of California utilities to be 67%
oil, 25% hydro, 4% nuclear, 1% natural gas and 3% miscellaneous. H. Lock & J. VanKuiken,
Cogeneration and Small Power Production- State of PURPA 210 Implementation, 3 SOLAR L.
REP. 657, 688 (1981) 1hereinafter cited as Lock & VanKuiken].
216. In re Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 34 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 140, 160 (1980).
217. See Lock & VanKuiken, supra note 215, at 689. This survey reported the aggregate
fuel composition of Connecticut utilities to be 60% oil, 38% nuclear and 2% hydro.
218. This figure then was multiplied by the ratio of the marginal heat rate to the system
average heat rate to obtain the fuel credit. That is, cogenerators providing firm power received
117% the average fossil fuel cost at on-peak periods and 92% the average fossil fuel cost at off-
peak periods if they sold power to Connecticut Light & Power or the United Illuminating
Company. Self-Generator Rate Development, Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control,
in NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-77.
219. See supra note 85 for sample PURPA rates. Other commissions permitted several of
the above approaches. For example, Idaho decided that fuel costs could be based either on
historical or actual costs. If based on actual costs, however, then time-of-day metering had to
Some commissions decided to avoid the difficulty of verifying
utility production models and the expense to commissions and
would-be cogenerators in independently duplicating these purchase
figures, by specifying a generating unit for utilities to use in calculat-
ing avoided energy costs. While not as accurate in mirroring system
costs, this approach made it easier for cogenerators to ascertain the
energy credit they would receive for power produced. Thus, New
Hampshire set a purchase rate based on the most modem oil gener-
ating station in the state,22 ° while the Oregon PUC was required by
an act of the state legislature to set a minimum rate for cogenerators
at the fuel cost of the highest cost baseload plant currently serving
that state.22'
Another approach used by commissions to provide a simpler
and more easily verifiable purchase rate was to require the use of the
energy component of power purchased from a pool 222 as a proxy for
avoided costs. Both Iowa and New Jersey authorized the billing rate
for energy purchased from a pool as the acceptable measure of
avoided energy costs for utilities participting in pool
arrangements.223
While the billing rate of power from a pool might be an appro-
priate proxy of avoided costs for nongenerating utilities or utilities
that could never meet full load, participation in pools by generating
utilities to gain the advantages of central dispatch created more
thorny issues for state commissions. With central dispatch of power,
the pool brings lower cost units on line first and often charges the
participating utilities a price midway between the costs of pool
power and the costs the utility would have incurred but for the pool.
be employed to correlate power delivery with production costs. Cogeneration and Small Power
Production (Idaho), 107 PUBLIC UTILITIES FORNIGHTLY 58 (May 7, 1981).
220. An allowance was made for more expensive generation when this unit was down. R.
Lock Statewide Purchase Rates Under § 210 ofPURP,4, 3 SOLAR L. REP. 419, 419-52 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Lock].
221. The Portland General Electric coal-fired plant at Boardman, Oregon has been used
to calculate this base rate. Order No. 82-515 (reported in 12 REG. INFO. EXCHANGE BULL. 53
(Oct. 1982)) [hereinafter cited as REG. INFO. EXCHANGE].
Some Commissions left this unit-specified approach as an option for at least some utilities.
While mandating the production costing approach for large utilities, for example, Massachu-
setts allowed small utilities that might not have elaborate production models to specify an
appropriate unit to be used for such calculation instead. NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-
177.
222. A power pool is a group of utilities which conduct sales and purchases of electricity
among the member utilities to meet peak power needs more reliably or to provide more eco-
nomical service. For example, if two utilities have peak demand at different times of the day,
then if they pool their resources they need fewer generating units than if each operated
independently.
223. In re Iowa State Commerce Commission Rules Regarding Rates for Cogeneration
and Small Power Production, NRRI Draft, supra note 167, at B- 118. New Jersey actually
authorized an energy credit 10% above the billing rate. See supra note 49 and accompanying
text. In re the Consideration and Determination of Cogeneration and Small Power Produc-
tion Standards Pursuant to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (New Jersey),
NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-224.
Thus, utilities with low cost, efficient plants become sellers to the
pool and reap a profit that is half the difference between their run-
ning costs and those of the purchasing utilities. The purchasing utili-
ties save a similar amount in running costs. This "split-the-savings"
approach raised the question whether avoided costs should be calcu-
lated on the running costs a utility would have incurred butfor the
pool, or on a utility's actual costs of power as the result of obtaining
pool savings.
Utilities purchasing power from such a pool argued to the Con-
necticut DPUC that their ratepayers would lose the savings that
these purchases permitted if the utilities were to forfeit this cheaper
pool power and to pay avoided cost rates based on the power they
otherwise would have generated without pool participation. The
Department responded to this argument and permitted a 5 percent
reduction in the energy credit paid by these utilities to reflect the loss
of a power pool savings share when a utility purchased from a quali-
fying facility instead of from the pool.2 24 The Massachusetts DPU
noted, however, that selling utilities gained from QF purchases; QF
purchases gave selling utilities more power to sell to the pool but
maintained the amount of avoided costs. The Department, there-
fore, developed a formula through which rates for a QF would be
increased or decreased depending on whether the utility was a net
seller or buyer during the period in question.225
Other commissions concentrated on the manner in which pools
affected generating utilities' running costs rather than billing rates.
Both the Florida and New York state commissions, for example,
noted that selling utilities incurred higher energy costs than they
otherwise would have if they did not make off-system sales to the
pool. Purchasing utilities, on the other hand, incurred lower costs
than they would have if they had run their less efficient equipment
instead of making economy purchases. Supporters of cogeneration
argued that maximum incentives would result if avoided costs were
calculated on a selling utility's running costs after all off-system sales
were made, and a purchasing utility's costs were calculated as if it
could make no off-system purchases. Utility and ratepayer advo-
cates argued that avoided costs should be calculated for both buying
and selling utilities before any off-system sales or purchases were
made.
224. NRRI Draft, supra note 218, at B-75.
225. The DPU specified the "Savings Share Avoided Cost" as SS=[(EX - IM)/(EX +
IM)] x VSS, where: SS is the avoided cost of the pool savings share; EX is the number of
hours of export of power to the pool in the same seasonal period one year before the rating
period, adjusted for scheduled maintenance; IM is the number of hours of import over the
same time period; VSS is the weighted average value of pool savings share per kilowatt-hour
from the most recent period of the same length as the projected period. Id. at B-178.
The Commissions that investigated these problems most thor-
oughly tended to compromise. Florida decided that selling utilities
should calculate avoided energy costs before off-system sales were
made, but purchasing utilities should make such calculations after
economy purchases were made.2 26 New York decided that the en-
ergy credit should be based on the average of the running costs of
the pool and of the plant the utility would have run, but for the
pool. 2" Vermont reasoned that, since all its jurisdictional utilities
belonged to NEPOOL,228 and NEPOOL was virtually always burn-
ing oil, the running cost of three of the pool's most efficient oil-fired
baseload plants was the most appropriate measure of the energy
credit due cogenerators.229
If a nongenerating utility did not belong to a pool but bought
power from a single utility system, commissions employed similar
approaches. Some, like Kansas, chose the energy component of the
wholesale billing rate as the appropriate measure of avoided costs.
230
These commissions argued that the energy component of the billing
rate was the only cost that a nongenerating utility actually could
avoid. Other commissions, like Rhode Island, however, asked that
the nongenerating utility supply the avoided cost data of its supply-
ing utility.23 1 Many commissions argued that the wholesale billing
rate often reflects average energy costs rather than the costs avoided
by the supplying utility on the margin. Again commissions were re-
quired to choose between maintaining ratepayers' benefits and en-
couraging cogeneration.
Only one commission whose orders were reviewed expressly
stated that the energy credit offered by jurisdictional utilities should
be based on embedded energy costs. The Kansas commission, which
issued its order while the AEP case was pending, justified this ap-
proach on the grounds that the FERC rule might be changed at any
time as the result of the uncertainty surrounding that rule.2 32 Lower-
ing the rate offered in the near future after an adverse decision
would have been detrimental to investors. The Kansas commission
further reasoned that, since other utility rates were based on embed-
ded energy costs, cogenerator rates also should be based on embed-
ded costs.
226. In re Cogenerators and Small Power Producers, 47 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 281,
286 (1982).
227. This approach benefited purchasing utilities, in particularly, Consolidated Edison. It
gave slightly higher avoided costs than would otherwise have been the case to upstate utilities
that sold power. In re Consolidated Edison Co., 48 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 94, 101 (1982).
228. NEPOOL is the New England Power Pool Agreement.
229. Lock, supra note 220, a 426.
230. NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-143.
231. 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 609, 613 (1981).
232. NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-143.
At least half the states offered a "net billing" option. By run-
ning the meter backwards when the cogenerator is supplying power
to the utility, this method effectively pays the embedded costs of both
energy and capacity.233 Only the net surplus or deficit of power gen-
erated is noted on the cogenerator's bill at the end of the month.
Many commissions justified the use of this approach for small
cogenerators on the basis of the extensive costs associated with dual
metering and with calculation of time-of-delivery payments. With-
out this approach, the commissions argued, there would be a strong
economic disincentive for small self-generators, which was contrary
to the intent of PURPA.
234
A number of states included in the energy credit other al-
lowances or incentives based on some of the factors the FERC
guidelines had required commissions to consider.235 Many of the
commissions that did not use production costing models, for exam-
ple, specifically requested that variable operation and maintenance
costs be included in the energy credit. While most commissions left
the exact amount of this allowance to utility discretion, the Maine
PUC established a rebuttable presumption that the allowance was 3
mills/kwh.2 36 Most other commissions specified the source of these
costs to be, for example, system lambda data or section 133 filings.2 37
An allowance for line losses in the transmission of power was
another frequently specified item. Because cogenerators often are
233. The exact number of states offering this option is difficult to ascertain, since some
states simply assumed that cogenerators would supply only surplus energy to the grid and did
not discuss the metering options available in their orders. Missouri, for example, made this
assumption. Telephone Interview with Bill Washburn, Missouri PSC.
Other states specifically noted this option while expressing some limitation on its use.
Arkansas, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania all limited the size of cogenerators
to whom this option was available, while California determined that any facility using this
option must then have a rate schedule with standby and backup rates. In re Rules Regulating
the Rates and Service of Cogenerators and Small Power Producers (Arkansas), NRRI Draft,
supra note 169, at B-19; 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 352, 376 (Idaho 1980); 42 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 536, 539 (Me. 1981); supra note 209, at B-175 (Mass.); 52 PA. ADMIN. CODE
§ 57.34(b)(i) (Shepard's 1983); 34 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 148, 162 (Cal. 1980).
234. The FERC itself appeared to be somewhat equivocal about the appropriateness of
this option, stating that it did not believe that "this is the only practical or appropriate method
to establish rates for small qualifying facilities," and that "net energy billing is likely to be
appropriate when the retail rates are marginal cost-based, time-of-day rates." 45 Fed. Reg.
12,224 (1980).
235. Supra note 20; 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e) (1980).
236. 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 536, 543 (1981).
237. Section 133 of PURPA required utilities with retail sales in excess of 500 million kwh
per year to file certain data on their marginal costs. While not directly translatable into
PURPA rates, this data could be useful in establishing or verifying components of the
purchase rate offered. Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, North
Carolina and Kansas all specified the inclusion of variable operation and maintenance and
some source for obtaining avoided cost data. In re Connecticut Light and Power Co., 41 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 46 (Conn. 1981); 47 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 281, 284 (Fla. 1982); In
re Cogenerators and Small Power Producers, 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 196, 202 (Mont. 1982);
Lock, supra note 217, at 423 (N.H.); NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-142 (Kan.), B-236
(N.C.).
situated more closely to the actual points of power consumption than
are remote central generating stations, commissions felt that
cogenerators should receive an allowance for the transmission losses
the utility would avoid. Some commissions set a specific figure for
this allowance.23 Others varied the credit according to the voltage
level of the cogenerators.239 Rhode Island, however, followed the
theoretically correct approach and asked utilities to determine the
line loss credit on a case-by-case basis.24
A number of allowances were mandated by only one or two
commissions. Montana and North Carolina both asked for the in-
clusion of an allowance for changes in working capital,24' while
Connecticut and New Hampshire mandated an allowance for reduc-
tions in inventory, handling and depreciation.242 The Maine PUC
offered a 3 percent increase in payment for utility dispatch243 and a 1
percent increase for co-ordinated maintenance. 2 " Vermont included
a generous "inflation factor" of 20 percent.245 Connecticut, although
it did not offer a capacity payment, determined that firm energy was
nevertheless worth more than as-available energy and offered a 3
percent incentive for firm power.246 New Jersey mandated a 10 per-
cent increase in the energy credit based on the benefit to the state
and to the nation in reducing use of imported oil.
247
Of the thirty-six states for which information on the standard
purchase rates was available,248 the energy component of the rate
varied by more than a factor of eight. Vermont offered the highest
rate: 9 cents per kilowatt-hour generated on peak and 6.6 cents per
238. Montana, for example, specified a line loss factor of 8.3% to be paid by the Montana
Power Company--the load weighted transmission losses of the utility system. 45 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 196, 201 (Mont. 1982). Florida issues a more general order requiring utilities
to pay the inverse of their fuel and purchase power cost recovery factors. 46 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 282, 286 (Fla. 1982). Kansas only offered one-half the authorized line-loss factor.
NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-152.
239. Connecticut varied the line loss factor according to the time-of-day, the distribution
level and the voltage level of the qualifying facility. Credits ranged from 2.4% if power was
supplied off-peak, at over 2.4 kV and at the primary distribution level, 8.7% if supplied on-
peak, at under 2.4 kV and at the secondary distribution level. NRRI Draft, supra note 218, at
B-77. Massachusetts set different rates for those transmitting power at less than 4 kv, between
4 and 14 kv, between 14 and 115 kv, and over 115 kv. See Energy User News, Apr. 5, 1982, 20.
240. 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 609, 612 (1981).
241. 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 196, 202 (Mont. 1982); NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at
B-241 (N.C.).
242. 41 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 46 (Conn. 1981); Lock, supra note 220, at 424 (N.H.).
243. Utility dispatch permits the utility to control the dispatch of the cogenerator's power.
42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 536, 551 (1981).
244. Co-ordinated maintenance permits the scheduling of the qualifying facility's mainte-
nance at the convenience of the utility. Id.
245. Lock, supra note 220, at 426.
246. NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-78.
247. Id at B-224.
248. These rates generally applied in the spring of 1982 and were reported in Energy User
News, Apr. 5, 1982.
kilowatt-hour generated off peak. 249 An Indiana utility offered the
lowest rates: 1.36 cents per kilowatt-hour generated on peak and .81
cents per kilowatt-hour generated off peak. Even within a state the
energy credit could vary considerably, presumably because of utility
differences in fuel mixes. Table A-I in the Appendix demonstrates a
considerable difference in the purchase rates of Gulf Power and
Tampa Electric in Florida. 50
While a large part of this variation can be attributed directly to
fuel costs, 251 the variation also is due to the methologies chosen by
commissions to calculate avoided energy costs and the additional
costs or incentives they chose to include in this credit. Commissions
often were required to choose between approaches that minimized
costs to utilities and, presumably, costs to ratepayers and ones that
offered more encouragement to cogenerators. Some commissions
felt that the extrinsic values of cogeneration, like reducing the use of
imported oil, increasing source diversification and keeping power
purchases within the local economy, more than offset the small addi-
tional burden that marginal cost ratesetting might place on ratepay-
ers. Others did not.252
2. The Capacity Credit. -Because the FERC mandated pay-
ment of a capacity credit only if a utility needed new capacity,25 3 all
commissions did not include a determination of or a method for de-
termining a capacity component in the standard rate. Alabama,
Connecticut, Delaware, Rhode Island and Vermont all declared that
their utilities had excess capacity 254 and thus rendered unnecessary
the development of a methodology for determining qualification for
a capacity credit.
Other commissions, often appearing to be overwhelmed by the
burden of ascertaining the accurate cost of avoided capacity, left the
payment of a capacity credit to the discretion of the utility. The
Florida PSC vacated its original rule on capacity payments as giving
too little guidance and left such payments to the discretion of the
249. Although one of Consolidated Edison's tariffs is higher than Vermont's, it includes a
capacity component and thus is inappropriate for comparison.
250. See supra text accompanying note 267.
251. In 1981 coal accounted for 89% of the fuel burned in Indiana utilities. Lock and
VanKuiken, supra note 215, at 691. Vermont utilities, however, as participants in NEPOOL,
virtually always burned oil on the margin. See supra note 47.
252. The New York PSC flatly stated, "Our goal is to see that the Con Edison tariffs are
neither an artificial barrier, nor a spur, to the development of on-site generation in its service
territory." 48 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 94, 99 (1983). To date no one appears to have raised
the issue whether this goal is in harmony with the PURPA mandate to encourage
cogeneration.
253. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
254. Calculating Capacity Costs in Cogenerated Rates, 108 PUBLIC UTILITIES FORT-
NIGHTLY 57, 58 (Ala.) (Sept. 24, 1981); NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-3 (Del.); B-80
(Conn.); 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 609, 615 (R.I. 1981); Lock, supra note 220, 426.
utility in case-by-case negotiation until such time as the PSC could
return to rulemaking on the issue. 2" The Illinois Commerce Com-
mission also found it difficult to ascertain a utility's avoided costs
and decided to leave such payments indefinitely to "good faith" ne-
gotiations between the utility and the QF.256
Some commissions appeared to be irritated with the FERC for
requiring them to implement the payment of a credit that the FERC
itself had admitted was difficult to determine. The Massachusetts
DPU, while dutifully prescribing a procedure for calculation of a
capacity credit for the standard rate, called such a determination a
"fool's errand. ' 257 In spite of the difficulties involved, however, over
half the states whose orders were reviewed made an attempt to pre-
scribe a method for calculating the capacity credit.
The most common method prescribed for determining the ca-
pacity credit is the unit specified approach. Under this approach the
commission determined an appropriate generating unit for calculat-
ing the capacity payment. For example, the California PUC decided
that, since new capacity was required only because of demand in
peak generating hours, the appropriate measure of avoided capacity
was a gas turbine generating unit.258 New Jersey also chose such a
unit, not because of the need for new capacity, but because either a
gas turbine unit or cogeneration would offer a more optimal mix in a
utility system overly dependent on oil.259
North Carolina chose a gas turbine unit as the appropriate
measure of avoided capacity for a short-term contract, but felt that a
more expensive baseload generating unit was the appropriate meas-
ure if a QF entered into a contract of 11 years or more (the approxi-
mate time it takes to bring a baseload plant on line).26° Other
variations on this approach included that the Pennsylvania commis-
sion's, which permitted any QF willing to enter a long-term contract
to choose the unit on which the capacity payments would be based if
the utility had planned more than one plant addition.261 The Ore-
gon Legislature mandated a minimum capacity credit, like its mini-
mum energy credit, based on the highest cost baseload plant in the
state. The size of the credit was tied to the length of the contract.262
255. 47 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 282, 288 (1982).
256. Calculating Capacity Costs in Cogenerated Rates, 108 PUBLIC UTILITIES FORT-
NIGHTLY 59 (Sept. 24, 1981).
257. NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-166.
258. 34 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 148, 160 (1980).
259. NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-255.
260. Id at B-237. Montana took an approach similar to North Carolina's, but authorized
the higher capacity payment if a QF entered a contract for more than four years. 45 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 196, 202 (1982).
261. 52 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 57, 34(c)(4)(C)(iv) (Shepard's 1983).
262. Again, the Portland General Electric plant was used to calculate avoided costs. The
minimum capacity credit to be offered, based on this plant's cost, was: $2.20 + n(.04975),
The determinations made by Utah and Idaho regarding Utah
Power present a graphic example of the manner in which commis-
sion decisions radically could affect the size of payments to cogener-
ators. The Utah commission approved a capacity credit of 26 mills
per kilowatt-hour based on the composite cost of 35 mills per kilo-
watt-hour of Utah Power's planned Hunter II nuclear power plant.
The Idaho commission approved a composite capacity credit of 51.7
mills per kilowatt-hour based on Utah Power's planned Hunter III
and IV nuclear power plants.263 While the unit specified approach
may have simplified the task of both commissions in determining a
capacity credit, the discrepancy in choices demonstrates the inaccu-
racies involved in choosing one unit on which to base avoided costs
instead of considering system-wide savings resulted from the addi-
tion of cogenerators.
A second method chosen by a number of state commissions for
its simplicity and ease of administration was pricing the capacity
credit at the cost of capacity bought form a pool. Both Massachu-
setts and New Jersey determined that capacity deficient utilities
should pay cogenerators at the rate of the capacity deficiency charge
the utilities paid to their respective power pools. 264 A number of
other commissions also adopted this approach towards nongenerat-
ing utilities and specified that the capacity component of the whole-
sale rate of power purchased from another utility was an acceptable
measure of avoided cost.
265
The Texas Task Force on Cogeneration, however, noted that
nongenerating utilities often are tied into long-term capacity con-
tracts and cannot avoid these payments merely by purchasing power
from cogenerators. The Task Force thus recommended avoidance of
capacity payments by nongenerating utilities unless the nongenerat-
ing utilities then could reduce their contracted capacity payments to
supplying utilities. 26 6 The FERC, however, noted in its commentary
on the section 210 rules that "the mandate of PURPA to encourage
cogeneration and small power production requires that obligations
to purchase under this provision supercede contractual restrictions
on a utility's ability to obtain energy or capacity from a qualifying
facility. ' 267 The Texas position, therefore, does not appear to con-
form with the FERC's guidelines.
where n is the number of years in the contract (varying from I to 35) and payment is in $/kw-
month. See supra REG. INFO. EXCHANGE note 221, at 54.
263. The Utah PSC noted this discrepancy along ith Utah Power's belief that the Idaho
figure represented an "unwarranted subsidization of qualifying facilities." NRRI Draft, supra
note 169, at B-362.
264. Id at B-181 (Mass.); B-224 (N.J.).
265. Oklahoma and Iowa approved this approach where applicable. See id. at 17; B- 118.
266. Id. at B-339.
267. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,219 (1980).
A third approach embraced by commissions has been to set the
capacity credit at the utility's carrying charge for prospective capac-
ity. Thus, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission required an esti-
mate of the annual carrying charge of the next generating unit to
come on line, which then was divided by the anticipated number of
hours this unit would operate per year, to determine the capacity
payment per kilowatt hour available to cogenerators.
268
The most sophisticated approach to determining the capacity
payment has been termed the "differential revenue requirement
method. 269 Under this formula, a utility or commission determines
its optimum capacity expansion plan without QFs. Then it reop-
timizes the plan considering the input of QFs to the grid. The differ-
ence in capital costs between these two plans represents the avoided
capacity costs available to QFs. Both Maine and Texas have imple-
mented variations of this approach.27 °
The differential revenue requirement method, though theoreti-
cally correct, requires highly sophisticated planning models for im-
plementation. Many commissions simply do not have the computer
or human resources to utilize such an approach or to verify utility
computations using this approach. 27' Furthermore, implementation
requires many assumptions about future load requirements and the
relative costs of various types of new generating capacity.
A number of commissions noted the FERC's comment that
payment of an energy credit based on current high fuel prices and a
capacity credit based on the high costs of a baseload plant to a
cogenerator results in an overpayment of avoided costs by the utility.
These commissions, therefore, when approving a capacity credit, re-
vised the energy credit to reflect the cost of energy for the unit speci-
fied plant.272
268. That is, CC = [AC/(8760 x capacity utilization)]REP, where CC is the capacity com-
ponent, AC is the present value of the annual carrying charge, 8760 is the number of hours in
the year, and REP is the "relative efficiency at peak" of the power producer (an estimation of
the correlation of self-generation with utility peak demand). NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at
17. This approach has been called the "simplified incremental cost approach" by the NRRI,
since it can also be applied to system wide planned additions to achieve an average capacity
carrying charge. NRRI Report, supra note 204, at 97.
269. NRRI Report, supra note 204, at 94.
270. 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 536, 541 (Me. 1981); see also NRRI Draft, supra note
169, at B-351 (Tex.).
271. In 1980 it was reported, for example, that Colorado had only fourteen professionals
on its PUC staff dealing with electric utility regulation. Dean, supra note 40, at 157. Further-
more, a study by the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC)
revealed that only 23 states perform in-house load forecasting or hire consultants for forecast-
ing. The remaining states either rely on utility forecasts or indicate no involvement with load
forecasting at all. NRRI Report, supra note 204, at 72 (citing NARUC, 1980 Annual Report on
Utility and Carrier Regulation 675 (1981)).
272. Montana stated that the energy component of long-term rates should be based on the
"projected running costs of the next baseload plant," whereas the energy component of short-
term rates was based on a "one contract year projection of annual load weighted average
system lambda." 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 196, 203 (1982). Commissions that chose a
A final issue confronted by commissions in setting both energy
and capacity credits involved the frequency of rate update. If pay-
ment was based on actual time of delivery costs, this issue did not
arise. If rates were based either on projections of costs or historical
averages, however, the commissions had to decide the frequency
with which the averages or projections would be updated. Most
commissions chose to require review of the standard rates in con-
junction with some related activity-for example, as part of the util-
ity's regular rate review case 273 or the biennial submission of system
cost data required by section 133 of PURPA.274
Some commissions, however, determined that other schedules
of review might offer more encouragement to cogenerators. Because
industries like to be able to project future costs and returns with
some certainty before making investment commitments, the New
Hampshire PUC decided that the energy price set in its final order
would prevail until the Seabrook nuclear plant came on line, and in
any case, would be available to any QF, currently entering a con-
tract, for the life of that contract.275  Granite State Electric Com-
pany, however, appealed this ruling, and the New Hampshire
Supreme Court reversed the commission's decision, and stated that
the ruling "violated the commission's duty to set rates from time to
time as condition warranted. 276
The California PUC, conversely, noting rapidly rising oil prices
at the time, declared the QFs should have the advantage of these
rises and thus mandated quarterly updates of fuel costs for the en-
ergy credit.277 Other commissions chose to adjust the energy credit
by tracking the movement of the fuel cost adjustment factor.27 8
With the recent fall in oil prices, these adjustments are now decreas-
ing and not increasing cogenerators' payments.279
Table 1 in the Appendix presents a compilation of the standard
PURPA purchase rates and residential retail sales rates of selected
relatively inexpensive type of generating unit on which to base the capacity credit, like a gas
turbine peaking unit, did not necessarily adjust the energy component. See, e.g., North Caro-
lina's Order, supra note 214.
273. Massachusetts required the energy credit to be adjusted whenever utilities filed for
their fuel adjustment charge, while Kansas required that the capacity credit be adjusted as the
utility's authorized rate of return per unit was. See NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-178, B-
148.
274. See supra note 237 for a discussion of § 133. North Carolina decided to update both
energy and capacity credits at these times-with fuel cost adjustment factors being applied in
the interim. See NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-249.
275. Lock, supra note 220, at 424.
276. Appeal of Granite State Electric Company, 121 N.H. 787, 435 A.2d 119 (1982).
277. 34 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 148, 160 (1980).
278. See supra note 274 for a discussion of North Carolina law.
279. See Table I (Appendix). Since the spring of 1982, utilities marked with a (-) have
lowered their PURPA purchase rates, presumably because of lower fuel costs.
utilities.28 ° Not only does the table show the variety of methods that
commissions chose to structure both purchase and sales rates, but
also illustrates the extent to which a single utility may have been
treated differently by different commissions. The capacity credits
payable by Utah Power, for example, ranged from 26 to 35 to 47.9
mills per kilowatt-hour, depending on whether the cogenerator was
located in Wyoming, Utah or Idaho, respectively.
While comparisons of residential rates and standard PURPA
rates are probably more meaningful for small power producers, a
glance at this table shows that, for many utilities, commercial rates
would have to be considerably lower than these residential rates to
make simultaneous buy-and-sell attractive to a cogenerator. 281 In
spite of the full-avoided cost mandate, the PURPA rates are lower
than the average cost based residential retail rates in nearly every
case. Under these circumstances, the main incentive to cogenerate
probably is avoidance of payment of retail electricity rates, rather
than sale of power to the utility. If relatively low purchase rates are
offered, industries presumably would choose to sell only excess
power to the utility.
C. Determining Eligibilityfor PURPA Purchase Rates
While the FERC already had set minimum ownership and effi-
ciency standards for certification of cogenerators as qualifying facili-
ties,282 state commissions frequently added criteria of their own for
obtaining certain incremental payments on the energy credit or pay-
ment of the capacity credit. In some cases, commissions also relaxed
the FERC's criteria for full avoided cost payments. In particular, a
number of states decided that the standard purchase rates should be
available to "old" as well as to "new" cogenerators.283
280. Information for this table was compiled from Slates Cogeneration Rate-Selling Under
PURP4, Energy Users News, Apr. 5, 1982, 19-22; May 23, 1983, 16-17; May 30, 1983, 17-18;
Lock, supra note 220, at 688-70 1; MOODY'S PUBLIC UTILITY MANUAL (1982); REG. INFO. Ex-
CHANGE, supra note 221.
281. For those who produce and consume similar amounts of electricity, simultaneous
buy-and-sell is only attractive if purchase rates are greater than sales rates. For example, if a
cogenerator sold 1000 kwh of electricity to Public Service of Indiana at the standard PURPA
rate of 1.33/kwh, while simultaneously purchasing 1000 kwh from the utility at its lowest
residential rate of 3.580/kwh (see Table A), the transaction would result in a net loss to the
cogenerator of $25.47. Only a net billing option or direct consumption of the electricity self-
generated (without sending it to the utility) would result in total avoidance of the utility's
$35.80 charge for 1000 kwh.
Purchase rates that are lower than utility sales rates could be attractive if the individual or
firm could install equipment that generated enough surplus power to produce an adequate
return on the capital invested. No one appears to suggest, however, that a payment of
1.33/kwh would produce such a return.
Commercial rates were not included here because of the large number of categories utili-
ties often have for commercial and industrial firms and the difficulty of obtaining information
on comparable categories.
282. See supra note 61.
283. For definition of a "new" vs. "old" cogenerator, see note 79. California and Virginia
Similarly, the FERC only required that standard purchase rates
be made available to qualifying facilities of less than 100 kw capac-
ity. A number of commissions determined, however, that the availa-
bility of standard rates to larger cogenerators would simplify their
administrative burden and would encourage good faith negotiation
between utilities and cogenerators. Both parties then would know
the minimum purchase rate that the cogenerator legally could de-
mand. Accordingly, of the thirty-six states for which purchase rate
information was available, twenty-two offered the standard rates to
larger cogenerators. One state2 84 limited the availability of the rate
to cogenerators with less than 500 kw capacity, and six285 limited it
to cogenerators with less than 1000 kw (1 MW) capacity.
Most states that offered a capacity credit made payment of the
credit contingent upon the cogenerator's fulfillment of certain quali-
fying conditions. The most common condition was that the cogener-
ator deliver "firm" power. The cogenerator was required to contract
to supply a certain amount of capacity. Some states, arguing that
unless the outside power supply could be depended on for a certain
number of years, utilities could not integrate it into their system
planning, specified a minimum contract length. Thus, Pennsylvania
required a minimum contract length of ten years, the approximate
time required to bring a new baseload plant on line.2 86 Maine, how-
ever, required a minimum contract term of only half that length, and
declared that a five year time frame was sufficient for a utility to
defer or alter system planning.287 Other states determined thresholds
to be rather arbitrary and instituted graduated payment schemes
through which a QF received a small capacity payment for a one
year contract, but a very significant payment for a maximum length
contract of thirty-five years.288
Some state commissions made the capacity credit contingent on
the cogenerator's reliability. Some utilities feared that a QF might
build a plant with a 10 MW rated capacity, enter a long-term con-
decided to give qualifying status to old facilities. 34 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 148, 163 (Cal.
1980); 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 315, 317 (Va. 1982). North Carolina chose to phase the
capacity credit in for old facilities at the rate of 10 percent per year. NRRI Draft, supra note
169, at B-252. Pennsylvania, however, offered PURPA rates only to old facilities that could
show that they would have to go out of business with the rate they would otherwise receive. 52
PA. ADMIN. CODE § 57.34(g) (Shepard's 1983).
284. PA. ADMIN. CODE § 57.34(0(1) (Shepard's 1983).
285. 11 REG. INFORMATION EXCHANGE Q. BULL. 14 (1982) (Ark.); 10 REG. INFORMATION
EXCHANGE Q. BULL. 34 (1982) (Del.); 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 536, 539 (1981 Me.);
NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-70 (Conn.); B-225 (N.J.); B-366 (Utah).
286. 42 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 57.34(c)(7)(i) (Shepard's 1983).
287. 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 536, 548 (1981).
288. See supra note 261 for Oregon's formula. North Carolina and Montana did not give
graduated payments but changed the payment basis from a peaking unit to a baseload generat-
ing unit at 11 and 4 years respectively. NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-237 (N.C.); 45 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 595, 597 (1982).
tract to supply this amount of power and then actually deliver power
only a small fraction of the time. Thus, the utility would pay a ca-
pacity credit that exceeded its cost to generate a similar amount of
power. Both Montana and Idaho, therefore, required QFs to meet a
minimum capacity factor 289 to obtain a full capacity credit.2 90 If the
QF failed to meet this capacity factor, then the capacity payment
was prorated.29' Utah, however, required QFs to meet a specified
capacity factor or to forfeit any capacity payment;292 Maine required
only that contracted capacity be "reliable."2 93
Other states evaded the necessity of determining a minimum ca-
pacity factor by requiring the cogenerator to contract for supplying a
certain amount of energy, rather than a certain amount of capacity.
Thus, the Massachusetts DPU required the cogenerator to contract
to supply "x" kilowatt hours per billing period or forfeit the capacity
payment for that period.294
Since only power produced in the hours of peak system demand
helps to avoid the need for new capacity, a number of states required
peak hour production for a full capacity payment. North Carolina
based its capacity payment on the average number of kilowatt-hours
generated per peak hours;295 California offered a graduated series of
credits based on power production in off-, mid-, or on-peak hours.29 6
Other states offered a higher capacity payment in the season of peak
demand, usually the summer months.297 Pennsylvania, however,
only required that the cogenerator be a "relatively stable source" in
peak hours to qualify for the capacity credit.298
While the above requirements for receiving the capacity credit
of the standard rate were common to a number of states, a few of the
idiosyncratic conditions mandated highlight the range of issues ex-
plored and attitudes expressed by state commissions. The New
Jersey BPU, for example, thought that there was "an intrinsic value
to smaller, decentralized cogeneration," and therefore determined
that a QF only had to meet the general reliability criteria of the util-
289. The capacity factor of a unit is the ratio of the energy it actually produces to the
energy it could have produced if it had operated continuously.
290. Montana, 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 196, 205 (1982), assumed an 85% capacity
factor, and Idaho, 44 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 160 (1981) assumed a 65 or 75% one, depend-
ing on the utility in question.
291. Idaho pro-rated this figure both up and down. Thus, a facility that operated at a
capacity factor above the minimum required could actually receive a payment for a capacity
greater than its nameplace rating. 44 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 160, 162 (1981).
292. NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-367.
293. 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 536, 552 (1981).
294. NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-180.
295. Id at B-242.
296. 34 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 148, 161 (1980).
297. Some South Carolina utilities used this approach. See Cogeneration Rate-Setting
Under PURPA, Energy User News, May 30, 1983, 18.
298. Pa. Admin. Bull., Dec. 11, 1982, at 4240.
ity system to obtain the capacity credit.299 The Missouri PSC, on the
other hand, saw little use for self-generated power unless a large
enough increment already was on the line for the utility to avoid the
deployment of new capacity and asked its jurisdictional utilities to
state the aggregate of QF capacity that would be needed to avoid a
capacity cost. No capacity payment would be received by any QF
until there was enough QF capacity to meet this minimum threshold
aggregate. 3°
Only three states mandated a capacity payment to all cogener-
ators. While Kansas termed its capacity credit an "incentive" pay-
ment,3"' Idaho and Montana attached a certain minimum value to
"aggregate" capacity.30 2 These commissions found that, even if QFs
did not commit their capacity under long-term contract, the stochas-
tic nature of new QFs coming on line as old ones drop off would
ensure that a utility could depend on some fraction of this nonfirm
capacity in long-term system planning. Therefore, all QFs should be
entitled to at least a small capacity credit.
Table 2 in the Appendix summarizes some of the major options
that commissions considered when setting section 210 purchase
rates.30 3 Even a brief examination reveals the wide variety of ap-
proaches adopted by state commissions in determining both eligibil-
ity for purchase rates and the factors that should be included when
calculating full avoided costs.
D. Setting Rates for Sales to Cogenerators
Most of the states' initial orders focused on setting avoided cost
purchase rates. Generally, rulings on sales to cogenerators merely
repeated the FERC guidelines.3" Some commissions, most notably
California and Idaho,305 noted that the QF, with simultaneous buy
299. NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-224, 225.
300. 4 Mo. ADMIN. CODE 240-20.060(3)(A)(1) (1982).
301. NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-148.
302. Idaho chose 3 mills/kwh as an acceptable minimum, while Montana asked for one
based on the 42.5% availability of a gas combustion turbine. 40 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 563,
567 (Idaho 1981); 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 196, 203 (Mont. 1982).
303. This table is not meant to be an exhaustive representation of state implementation
proceedings. Rather, it is illustrative of the diversity of state approaches to PURPA purchase
rates. Moreover, because a state's final order did not explicitly specify a particular allowance
does not mean that the commission did not subsequently approve utility purchase rates that
included such an allowance. Information for this table was compiled from commission orders;
6-12 REG. INFORMATION EXCHANGE Q. BULL.; Energy User News, Apr. 5, 1982, 19-22; Mar.
7, 1983, 2; May 23, 1982, 16-17; May 30,1983, 17-18; Lock, supra note 220; Calculating Capacity
Costs in Cogenerated Rates, 108 PUBLIC UTILITY FORTNIGHTLY 57-60 (Sept. 24, 1981); Memo,
Status of PURPA Section 210 Implementation By 17 Selected State Commissions (FERC 1983).
304. Rates for sales should be "just and reasonable and in the public interest" and should
not "discriminate against any qualifying facility in comparison to rate for sales to other cus-
tomers served by the electric utility." 18 C.F.R. § 292.305(a) (1980).
305. 34 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 148, 164 (Cal. 1980); 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 352,
378 (Idaho 1981).
and sell, always is buying electricity from the utility. Therefore with
an outage of QF equipment, there is a reduction only in utility
purchases; utility sales to cogenerators remain constant. Because
outages of QF equipment do not affect sales by utilities, cogenerators
should be treated just like other customers with similar load charac-
teristics and should pay similar rates. Rates for backup and supple-
mentary power thus become irrelevant.
The New York Public Service Commission, however, dealt ex-
tensively with the question of appropriate rates for sales to cogener-
ators. The commission authorized the use of a backup rate for
cogenerators that purchased power which they normally supplied
themselves.3 °6 To qualify for the backup rate, the customer had to
have a summer and winter load factor3 °7 of less than ten percent.30 8
The low load factor requirement was to ensure that, except for sys-
tem demands, QFs were not drawing power from the utility at times
of utility seasonal peak demand.
This backup charge contained a marginal transmission cost re-
covery component based on the assumption that thirty-six percent of
the backup usage of this class would be required in the eighty-nine
hour "load sensitive period" of the summer.30 9 The rate was to be
charged, however, over the full 504 hour summer period and con-
tained a distribution cost component, imposed for usage during sum-
mer peak and shoulder periods.3t0 Additionally, the PSC mandated
a penalty charge of twelve times the applicable amount if demand
exceeded contracted demand by up to ten percent, and twice this if
demand exceeded the contract by more than ten percent.3 ' Finally,
there was a fixed monthly charge relating to other fixed, customer-
related costs.
31 2
The commission set rates for supplementary power in a similar
306. Presumably the commission concurred with FERC in its assessment that Con Ed's
high retail was the major factor inducing cogeneration in its service area, and therefore QFs
would wish to sell surplus power only under the rate structure being authorized.
307. The load factor in this case is the ratio of the average amount of energy, or average
load, drawn by the QF during these two periods to the peak load drawn. In other words, a
10% load factor assumes the QF's equipment is operational 90% of the time if power use is
constant.
308. In re Consolidated Edison of New York, Inc., 48 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 94, 112
(1983).
309. 1d at 114. The 89 hour load sensitive period represents those hours in the summer
that are most likely to elicit such high electricity consumption that the utility system is likely to
be overtaxed and require expensive emergency measures.
310. A shoulder period is a period of intermediate demand. In both the shoulder and
peak cases, the distribution cost was recovered in a demand charge set at the highest demand
of the previous II months or at the current month's demand-whichever was higher. Id at
119.
311. Id
312. These included a $6.00 per month metering charge for small cogenerators and a $50
per month charge for large ones (over 900 kw). Id. at 120.
fashion. 31 3 The commission noted that under the FERC's rules, the
cogenerator had the option of choosing firm service rates until the
necessity for a separate charge system was proved. The commission,
however, chose the above described staff-proposed rate schedule to
encourage a load pattern that might help Consolidated Edison.31 4
The New Jersey BPU adopted an approach appearing more
favorable to QFs. This approach forgave the demand charge if
maintenance was scheduled at the utility's convenience and estab-
lished a "standby service" to which QFs could subscribe to obtain
emergency power.3 5 The standby charge reflected the cost of invest-
ment necessary to provide capacity at the rate of fifteen percent coin-
cident in QF outages at the generation and transmission level and
seventy-five percent at the distribution level.316
A number of states have set PURPA purchase rates well below
utility retail sales rates. Thus, the only real incentive for cogenera-
tion is the substitution of self-generated power for costly utility
purchased power. Under these circumstances, the QF wishes to sell
only surplus power to the utility. If net billing, or running the meter
backwards, is not permitted,3 7 then surplus sales require the use of
two meters and more complex interconnection equipment. Not only
does this considerably increase the cogenerator's installation costs,
but few states have grappled with the thorny issues of backup rates
under these conditions. For example, is it assumed that all QFs sell-
ing surplus power would require backup service at the same time,
and thus need to be charged the full demand rates of regular service
customers, or could an assumption of only a limited amount of "co-
incidence" be assumed to lower these rates? Until such issues are
resolved, high rates for sales to cogenerators may be as strong a dis-
incentive to cogeneration as low purchase rates.
E. Establishing Procedures and Costs/or Interconnection
Many commissions did not explore in detail the requirements
for interconnection or the allocation of interconnection costs. Some
repeated the FERC rule stating that incremental interconnection
costs were to be borne by the QF31 8 and suggested various payment
schedules. Most left the determination of the amount and type of
interconnection equipment necessary for utility safety and reliability
to the purchasing utility. Rhode Island, in a typical order, deter-
313. That is, they should recover transmission and distribution costs and contain a con-
tract charge to recover peak distribution costs. Id. at 122.
314. Id at 123.
315. NRRI Draft, supra note 169, at B-226.
316. Id at B-227.
317. Neither Michigan, 48 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 465, 471 (1983), nor Utah, NRRI
Draft, supra note 169, at B-367, permit net billing, for example.
318. 18 C.F.R. § 292.306 (1980).
mined that interconnection costs relating to sales by the utility
should be borne by the utility and that those relating to QF
purchases should be borne by the QF. The utility could prescribe
any equipment necessary to prevent flow of electricity into the grid
when the system was out of service, and the QF could pay its inter-
connection costs in monthly installments over a five-year period.
319
Perhaps due to Consolidated Edison's activity in the AEP case,
the New York Commission issued one of the most extensive orders
on interconnection. While Consolidated Edison argued that, as the
result of AEP it could not be required to interconnect with on-site
generators, the New York Commission determined that Congress
had not preempted its power to require such connections. 320 The
commission, therefore, required Consolidated Edison to interconnect
on its radial system and left interconnection to its network system on
a case specific basis.321 Like Rhode Island, New York required the
QF to pay costs incurred in delivery of power to the utility, which it
further specified as: (1) the incremental metering charge; (2) a nine
percent carrying charge to cover taxes, operation and maintenance;
(3) up front payment of first time interconnection costs; and (4) any
costs associated with engineering and feasibility studies related spe-
cifically to parallel operations.322
The New York order shows how interconnection costs also
might be a disincentive for small cogenerators. If a utility requires
extensive studies and numerous system protection devices, as well as
up front payment of the costs associated with these items, then the
additional costs thus incurred might make many small projects fi-
nancially unattractive.
The diversity of approaches adopted to set purchase and sale
rates, as well as to allocate and collect interconnection costs, have
resulted in rates in some states that are much more encouraging of
cogeneration than rates in other states. Commission attitudes to-
wards cogeneration varied considerably. Some states did little more
than implement PURPA procedurally, while others endeavored to
give cogeneration the substantive encouragement that they believed
the PURPA mandate required. The FERC rules appear to have
given states great flexibility in setting purchase rates, and, while a
few states may have set rates above "real" avoided costs, a much
greater number of states have set rates below embedded costs, and
thus below the long run marginal costs.
319. 42 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 609 (1981).
320. 48 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 94, 134 (1983).
321. Id. at 135. The technical details are beyond the scope of this article, but the network
system accepts only a uni-directional flow of electricity and therefore presents more complica-
tions when cogenerators attempt to put power into the system.
322. Id at 139.
VI. Industrial Response to the Federal Legislation
While much has been written about the intent and substance of
the federal legislative effort regarding cogeneration, there has been
little study of the actual results of this effort. Some of the more inter-
esting industrial ventures into cogeneration have received attention
from the newspapers,323 but virtually no attempt has been made to
evaluate the impact of this legislation on industry as a whole.
A. Direct Response to PURPA
Because of the need to obtain qualifying status to receive the
benefits of PURPA, perhaps the best indicator of PURPA's effects is
the FERC's quarterly report on cogeneration facility filings. 324 This
report lists by region the name, address, facility type and rated ca-
pacity of those firms that either notify the FERC of their qualifying
status or request FERC certification. While such a report clearly
indicates the number and dispersion of firms that have been en-
couraged to evaluate cogeneration by PURPA, the report probably
does not indicate accurately the amount of cogeneration that actu-
ally will come on line in the next few years. A request for certifica-
tion may be made at the initial planning stage of a project, but the
project may then be altered or abandoned as the result of subsequent
evaluation or unforeseen events.
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Additionally, the filings list has not been verified for definitional
accuracy. Not only is there the possibility of error inherent in self-
classification, but there is also the problem of dual qualification.
Two cogeneration filings in California, for example, specify "solar"
as the cogeneration fuel. While one exceeds the size limitation for
small power production facilities,326 the other presumably could
have filed for certification as a small power producer. Similarly,
there are a number of firms with "Cogeneration" in their names that
have applied for certification as small power production facilities.
Firms using biomass as their primary fuel appear to qualify under
323. See, e.g., Industry Examines Profit Prospects of Selling 'Cogeneration'Energy, Wall St.
J., Feb. 19, 1981, at 31; More Companies Burn Waste to Generate Energy, Cutting Fuel and
Disposal Costs, Wall St. J., Apr. 15, 1981, at 48.
324. Quarterly Report on Qualifying Small Power Production and Cogeneration Facility
Filings, compiled by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
325. Bi-State Development of St. Louis, Missouri, for example, filed notice of qualifica-
tion as a cogeneration facility for an 80 MW trash-to-energy project for the City of St. Louis.
The projected start-up of this plant is 1986, but Bi-State has been unable to obtain from Union
Electric what it feels to be a fair purchase rate for the electricity to be generated from this
project. Without an acceptable conclusion to negotiations with the utility, a plant half this size
will be built merely to supply steam to the city steam loop-although a boiler plate would be
installed in case the PURPA purchase rate improved in the future. Telephone Interview with
Paul Mydler, Bi-State Development Agency, April 22, 1983.
326. Small power production facilities were limited by Congress to 80 MW in size. 16
U.S.C.A. § 796(17)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1982).
either heading."' Firms presumably have applied for the type of
certification that would yield the greatest tax benefits or other incen-
tives for the project.32 Since the FERC does not require notification
of qualification under both definitions, only four filings note the pos-
sibility of this dual certification.329
Table A is a listing of the FERC's qualifying cogeneration fil-
Table A
FERC Filings for Qualification as New Facilities

































































327. That is, production of electricity and another form of useful energy qualifies it as a
"cogeneration facility" and producing energy solely by use of "biomass, waste, renewable re-
sources, or any combination thereof' qualifies it as a small power producer if it is less than 80
MW in size. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 796(17)(A), (18)(A) (West Supp. 1982).
328. Many states have offered tax credits, state energy tax exemptions, or loans to firms
investing in cogeneration or alternative energy systems. Often, however, such financial incen-
tives are offered to only certain specified types of energy systems, like solar or biomass systems.
For a listing of various incentives available, see COUNCIL ON STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF
THE STATES (1982).
329. Two of these filings are in Oregon, one in Kentucky, and one in Connecticut. They
represent a total capacity of 101,150 kw. Quarterly Report on Qualfying Small Power Produc-
lion and Cogeneration Facility Filings, January 1, 1983 [hereinafter cited as FERC's -filings].
Table B
Characteristics of New Capacity Facilities
(Total= 119)
A. Facility Size
100kw or Less 101-1000kw 1001-10,000kw More Than 10,000kw
7 26 39 47
B. Fuel Type
NG CO BIO CO/BIO WA FO SO





CO/BIO=mixture of coal and biomass
WA=waste product (filer defined)
FO=fuel oil #2 or #6
SO=solar
ings by state.330 It includes those small power filings that also noted
their cogeneration status, but does not include those filings from
which cogeneration might only be inferred from the firm's name,
technology and fuel type. In the first three years of reports, 119
cogenerators have filed for qualification of approximately 3500 MW
of new capacity. (This is equivalent to three to four new baseload
plants.) Nearly half of these filings (fifty-five) have come from Cali-
fornia. Slightly over two-thirds have come from just four states: Cal-
ifornia, Florida, Tennessee and Virginia. In terms of rated capacity,
however, Texas and Massachusetts combine with California to pro-
duce two-thirds of the total capacity offered by these new cogener-
ators. Thus, PURPA appears to have had minimal impact on
cogeneration in the remaining forty-four states.
The greater encouragement of cogeneration in these six states,
as compared to the remaining forty-four, results from a number of
factors. First, the rates offered to cogenerators appear to make si-
multaneous sale and purchase attractive. The PURPA purchase
rates of Pacific Gas and Electric in California, for example, are
higher than some of their retail sales rates. This also appears to be
true of Tampa Electric in Florida, Boston Edison in Massachusetts,
the TVA in Tennessee and Houston Light and Power in Texas.33'
With the exception of Virginia, these states offer standard rates to
cogenerators with a rated capacity of more than 100 kw. 332 As Table
330. Compiled from FERC's filings, id.
331. See Comparisons of PURPA standard purchase rates and residential retail rates in
Table 1, Appendix.
332. See Table 2, Appendix.
B illustrates, only seven of the 119 qualifying facilities had a rated
capacity of less than 100 kw. Thus, unless state commissions explic-
itly offered the standard PURPA rates to larger installations, the re-
maining 112 facilities would have had to resort to individual
negotiation. Apparently the availability of a standard rate strength-
ened the cogenerators' bargaining position by serving as a legal min-
imum to which cogenerators were entitled if negotiations faltered.333
All six of these states also had rules and rates in place by either
the FERC deadline of March 1981 or shortly thereafter.334 In con-
trast, three of the five states which still did not have final rules or
rates in March 1983 had no filings.335 Uncertainty about commis-
sion attitudes toward sale and purchase rates, therefore, also may
have cast a cloud over the development of cogeneration in some
states.
Indeed, the perceived attitudes of state commissions toward
cogeneration may be a major factor in its development. The Califor-
nia commission, for example, not only set favorable purchase rates,
but also permitted cogenerators to pay the same rate for natural gas
as electric utilities pay.336 Additionally, the commission gave
cogenerators priority over other industrial users during gas
shortfalls.337 As a further mark of its support of cogeneration, the
commission reduced Pacific Gas and Electric's authorized return on
equity by 0.2 percent because of its lack of effort to promote cogener-
ation. The return could only be regained if PG&E signed contracts
for at least 600 MW of new cogeneration capacity within the next
333. The unwillingness of utilities to negotiate with qualifying facilities was noted repeat-
edly in the Senate Hearings of April and May 1982. For example, the American Paper Insti-
tute noted that increased unwillingness of utilities to enter negotiations after the circuit court
vacated the FERC's avoided cost and interconnection rules. See Senate Hearing, Part I supra
note 118, at 333.
334. Florida issued final rules April 22, 1981, Massachusetts on July 23, 1981, and Texas
on August 20, 1981. Virginia issued orders on all its jurisdictional utilities except Virginia
Electric Power Company between June 18, and August 14, 1981, while the TVA, which covers
most of Tennessee, was offering a PURPA purchase rate by April 1981. California did not
issue its final PURPA Order until January 21, 1982, but the commission had been implement-
ing state legislation encouraging cogeneration since 1979, CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 922 (West
1979), and had purchase rates in effect in the interim. Information on California, Florida,
Massachusetts, Texas and Virginia from Memorandum, Narrative Status Report on Progress by
Certain State Regulatory Agencies Toward Implementation of PURPA Section 210, (FERC
1983). Information on the TVA from States' Cogeneration Rate-Setting Under PURPA, En-
ergy User News, Apr. 20, 1981, at 14.
335. Maryland, Minnesota and Wisconsin still had their PURPA rules pending and no
filings of qualified facilities as of January 1983. See Table A; Table 2, Appendix.
336. Cogenerators could get this preferred rate up on to the amount of gas that the utility
would have used to generate the same amount of electricity. That is, if Pacific Gas and Elec-
tric required 11,000 BTUs to generate a kwh of electricity, and an industry could generate a
kwh with 5000 BTUs (on a pro-rated basis), then it could apply the remaining 6,000 BTUs
allowed to its industrial process. In re Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 43 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 1 (1982).
337. In re Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 34 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR), 1, 114 (1980).
two years. 338 No other commission has assumed such an active role
in the support of cogeneration, nor has any other state encouraged as
much new cogeneration capacity. The natural gas incentives appear
to have been particularly significant, since forty of the fifty-five new
filings in the state have listed natural gas as their fuel type.
California offers a particular contrast with New York. Both
states are similarly populous and have similar fuel compositions in
the statewide utility systems.3 39 The New York commission, how-
ever, has appeared to respond in a lukewarm fashion to cogenera-
tion. Because of the perceived lethargy of the New York
commission in setting PURPA purchase rates, the state legislature
set its own minimum rate for all nonoil fired facilities at six cents per
kilowatt hour.340 The commission did not issue a final order until
May 1982, and then, while upholding the full avoided cost standard,
the commission stated its desire neither to encourage nor to discour-
age potential cogenerators in the Consolidated Edison service
area.341 Subsequent to the order's issue, purchase rates still had to
be put in place by all jurisdictional utilities. New York has gener-
ated only one cogeneration filing, and that for a facility of only 100
kw. The great disparity between California and New York may be
the result of the lack of any strong encouragement of cogeneration
by the New York commission and of the overt opposition of Consol-
idated Edison to cogenerators in its service area.342
In states with PURPA purchase rates set below retail sales rates,
cogeneration still might be encouraged, if qualifying facilities would
be given the option of net billing. Such an option allows the QF to
avoid retail, embedded cost payments for power used while permit-
ting sales of surplus power generated. A number of commissions,
however, either prohibited the net billing option or restricted it to
small QFs.343 Under these conditions, the extra expense involved in
setting surplus power only to the utility3 " may be the financial straw
that deters the development of cogeneration. Sales of excess power
only require the establishment of reasonable backup or standby
rates. Otherwise, the cogenerator pays a full service demand charge
338. Id. at 116.
339. In 198 1, the fuel composition of the California utility system was 67% oil, 25% hydro,
4% nuclear, 1% gas and 3% other. The fuel composition of the New York utility system was
63% oil, 15% hydro, 13% nuclear, 8% coal and 1% gas and other. Lock, supra note 220, at 688.
340. In re Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 48 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 94, 148
(1983) (citing N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66-c).
341. Id at 99; supra note 252.
342. Consolidated Edison had been one of the plaintiffs in the AEP case. It has been very
outspoken about its dislike of cogeneration in its service area. See Schwartz, Urban Cogenera-
ion. A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, 108 PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY No. 4 (Aug. 13, 1981).
(The author is senior vice-president of Consolidated Edison.)
343. See supra note 317.
344. See supra note 63.
year round to cover service required during the two to four weeks of
equipment outages necessitated by scheduled maintenance and
emergency repair.345
Commissions cannot be faulted in all states that show few or
more filings of cogeneration capacity. The Idaho Commission, for
example, perceiving Idaho Power's efforts to encourage cogeneration
to be inadequate, not only threatened to set its rate of return at the
"lower end of a range found to be reasonable," but also declared that
"[flailure to exhaust all power supplies available from cogeneration
and small power production shall be grounds for rejection of appli-
cations for certificates of convenience and necessity regarding con-
struction of conventional thermal units or for the issuance of
securities to finance such units." '346 Despite this activist stance, there
has been only one cogeneration filing in Idaho. 34
7
Vermont has had no cogeneration filings, although it has offered
one of the highest standard purchase rates in the country-9.0 cents
per kilowatt hour at on-peak times and 6.6 cents off-peak.348 The
obvious inference from the Vermont and the Idaho cases is that a
certain level or type of industrial activity already must be present in
a state for even strong PURPA incentives to have any effect. Such
incentives are not enough to bring new industry into an area, al-
though they may be sufficient to alter the energy consumption pat-
terns or technologies of established industries.349
Moreover, development almost everywhere has been discour-
aged by the uncertainties associated with PURPA itself. The Ameri-
can Paper Institute, for example, noted that PURPA could not
become a factor in plant planning until the FERC issued its rules.
After those rules were promulgated, many industries still felt that
they had to wait until their state commission implemented the rules.
In the middle of the implementation process, however, the AEP de-
cision was rendered, thus raising a cloud of doubt around the full
avoided cost rule and automatic access to interconnection.35°
Additional uncertainty has been created by an inability to pre-
345. To alleviate this impediment, the FERC suggested a variety of sales schedules to
cover emergency and scheduled outages of QF equipment. See supra notes 89 and 190.
346. 44 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 160, 164 (1982).
347. Idaho has had five hydro projects qualify as small power production facilities. Pre-
sumably the industrial base is lacking, but the water is not. FERC's Filings, supra note 329.
348. See Table I, Appendix, for the favorable comparison of these rates with Central
Vermont Public Service's residential retail rates.
349. Some commentators have argued that high electricity rates in certain areas of the
country may not be a significant inducement to cogenerate because energy intensive industries
have long ago left these areas. For those industries that remain, energy costs are too small a
proportion of their total overhead to induce much interest in energy conserving technologies
like cogeneration. See Good News For New England Energy-Cost Problems Easing, Wall St.
J., March 22, 1983, at 37.
350. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
dict fuel prices. In recent months, oil prices have declined considera-
bly, resulting in a decline in the energy credit payment for those
cogenerators who are paid on a real time or quarterly update ba-
sis.35" ' The American Paper Institute has concluded that few busi-
nessmen who are faced with these uncertainties will be willing to
make the incremental investment PURPA requires. "What is again
missing as it was prior to PURPA, is a price signal that will be rea-
sonably durable and certain.
352
B. Other Factors Affecting Industrial Response
Several surveys of industrial attitudes toward cogeneration have
been conducted to ascertain either its development potential or the
factors restricting its growth.3 53 Furthermore, the Senate hearings on
proposed amendments to PURPA elicited extensive industry com-
ment on PURPA's effectiveness. The general tenor of all this com-
ment has been that, while PURPA was a step in the right direction,
numerous factors remain to inhibit the development of industrial
cogeneration.
Many firms remain distrustful of utilities. Not only did a
number of industrial witnesses cite the AEP case as proof of the gen-
eral unwillingness of utilities to negotiate fairly with them,354 but
several also cited other instances of utility obstructionism. The
American Paper Institute noted that Consolidated Edison had been
insisting that a cogenerator must obtain an FPA interconnection or-
der to conduct sales "even where it is already physically interconnected
for a two-way flow of electricity. 35 ' An executive of the Potsdam
Paper Corporation related that firm's difficulties in trying to extract a
long-term contract from the Niagara-Mohawk Power
Corporation.356
Other government regulations also have been disincentives.
Several surveys found that firms in nonattainment areas regarding
certain criteria pollutants of the Clean Air Act, or in areas where the
pollution increments were very limited, preferred to reserve the lim-
351. See Table 1, Appendix, and note those utilities that experienced a decline in purchase
rates.
352. Senate Hearing, Part , supra note 118, at 333.
353. Resource Planning Associates, Edison Electric Institute and Arkansas Power and
Light all have done surveys that were reported in the Senate Hearings. See id. at 67, 78, 90. In
addition, a number of states have conducted surveys to determine the potential for cogenera-
tion in their states. See Cogeneration Blueprint for State Facilities, State of California (1981)
(prepared by the Dep't of General Services, Office of Appropriate Technology and Depart-
ment of Water Resources).
354. The Manager of External Energy Affairs at the Weyerhauser Company, for example,
said, "Achievement of the goals of PURPA has been handicapped primarily due to utility
unwillingness to offer an appropriate avoided cost." Senate Hearing, Part I, supra note 118, at
164.
355. Id. at 336.
356. Id. at 401.
ited increments they might have for changes in production related
processes.357 Thus, although cogeneration might reduce overall pol-
lutants because less fuel is burned by the dual production of electric-
ity and thermal energy than by producing each separately, the
individual firm would experience an increase in pollution emittants,
which it might be unable or unwilling to assume because of the per-
mitting requirements.35 s
The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (FUA),359 has also
acted as a disincentive. Gas turbine and diesel topping engines can
save more fuel than any other types of cogeneration. 360 They also
produce a higher electricity to steam ratio than conventional steam
boilers, are economical in small plant sizes and are more environ-
mentally beneficial than coal-fired boilers. FUA, however, man-
dated all feasible conversion of major fuel burning installations
(MFBIs) from oil and gas to coal and prohibited new oil or gas in-
stallations.361 Powerplants were subject to even broader prohibi-
tions.362 Since an installation was defined as a powerplant if it sold
more than one-half its generated electricity, any cogenerators partici-
pating in simultaneous buy and sell would have been subject to these
broader restrictions, even if only a small proportion of total fuel use
was attributable to power generation. Cogenerators participating in
simultaneous buy and sell subsequently were excluded from the
powerplant definition.363 In the interim, the regulations appear to
have dampened development of some cogeneration. 36
Furthermore, until August 1982 the procedure for obtaining the
FUA cogeneration exemption for MFBIs was exceedingly burden-
some. 365 At that time the requirements for exemption were simpli-
fied substantially, 366 but a new administration once again could
357. Both the Edison Electric Institute and Arkansas Power and Light mentioned this
disincentive. Id. at 67, 90.
358. California has tried to mitigate this disincentive by expediting air pollution permits
for cogenerators. 34 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 146, 168 (1980).
359. Pub. L. No. 95-620. See supra notes 54, 55.
360. B. WILKINSON & R. BARNES, COGENERATION OF ELECTRICITY AND USEFUL HEAT
11 (1980).
361. See supra notes 54, 55.
362. While the fuel-use restrictions applied only to boilers for MFBIs, they also applied to
diesel engines and gas turbines for power plants. In addition, new power plants were required
to have the capability of burning an alternate fuel. G. Comstock, FUA: The Transition to
Alternate Fuels in the Industrial and Electric Utility Sectors, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 337, 337-68
(1980).
363. See the discussion of this exclusion in 47 Fed. Reg. 29,209 (1982).
364. For a good discussion of the history of the regulations imposed for obtaining the
cogeneration fuel use exemption, see D. Irwin & K. Sisk, The Fuel UseAct and DOE'sRegula-
tions, 29 U. KAN. L. REV., 319, 319-36 (1980).
365. For a discussion of the burdens these regulations would impose on a firm seeking to
cogenerate, see B. Beckman & M. Prairie, Problem Areas in the Exemption Process Under the
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, id at 370-403.
366. See 47 Fed. Reg. 29,209 (1982). The oil and gas savings test for qualification for the
exemption was expanded to include the savings of the utility or other nonjurisdictional unit, as
tighten the exemptions for cogenerators and force mandatory con-
version, at least on those facilities that sell less than one-half their
generated electricity. In any event, the uncertainty that has sur-
rounded these regulations since their inception has been another rea-
son large industries have been reluctant to embrace cogeneration.
Finally, economic disincentives have slowed the initiation of
cogeneration. For most industrial processes, firms tend to use low-
pressure "package" boilers that are relatively inexpensive and mass-
produced. Most cogeneration projects, however, require custom
built, high-pressure boilers. Equipment specifications vary accord-
ing to the thermal versus electrical load needs of the firm. Such cus-
tom designing greatly increases the capital costs of a new boiler. 367
In times of economic recession and high interest rates, firms are re-
luctant to make these "nonessential" capital investments. A survey
of thirteen industries with cogeneration potential by the Edison Elec-
tric Institute revealed capital limitations and the financial health of
the particular business to be major inhibiting factors for five of the
industries.368
To justify an investment in a nonproductive venture, firms often
require a higher rate of return or a shorter payback period. One
study found that firms require at least a thirty percent rate of return
from such projects. 369 Setting a "higher hurdle" rate for cogeneration
projects than for production related projects results in the elimina-
tion of many projects that would meet a lower threshold of economic
feasibility. When energy costs are a relatively small proportion of a
firm's operating costs, there is little incentive to invest in a cogenera-
tion project unless the return from sale of the electricity is attractive.
Another inhibiting factor for some firms has been the risk asso-
ciated with an unfamiliar business venture. Most firms view them-
selves as lacking expertise in the electrical generation business. Not
only are there risks in choosing the appropriate technological config-
uration for a given plant's production and power needs, there is the
need to have experts on the plant staff who can maintain this more
sophisticated equipment. Many plant managers are unwilling to in-
vest in the additional training and labor costs necessary to reduce
these risks.
A final disincentive for plant managers considering cogenera-
tion investments has been the general uncertainties connected with
well as the MFBI itself, 10 C.F.R. § 503.37(b) (1982). In addition, the evidentiary requirement
in the ten year forecast was replaced by a Regional Estimates Table which the cogenerator
could use to estimate savings over this period. 10 C.F.R. § 503.37(e) (1982).
367. Diesel engines and gas turbines can be sold as packaged systems, but they are not
always suited to industrial process needs.
368. Senate Hearing, Part 1, supra note 118, at 79, 90.
369. Resource Planning Associates, in Senate Hearing, Part ,, supra note 118, at 94.
market behavior. Most states only permit the capacity credit if the
cogenerator is willing to sign a contract to be a firm supplier of
power.37° The minimum contract length required may be as long as
ten years. Thus, to acquire this more attractive payment rate, an
industry must be confident of its minimum thermal needs and power
output for a relatively long time span. It is not unreasonable to as-
sume that the economic climate of the past two years has made many
firms wary of making long-term commitments of future production
levels. Yet, levelized payments usually are only available to those
firms which sign such contracts. Nonfirm and sometimes even short-
term contract suppliers must accept payments that track the changes
in fuel prices. The more uncertain future fuel prices appear, the less
attractive this option becomes, since the future rate of return obtain-
able becomes increasingly uncertain.
Thus, cogeneration generally appears to be attractive only to in-
dustries in which at least one of three conditions prevail: (1) the
company already is a cogenerator and has existing expertise on its
staff for making the most of the PURPA incentives; (2) a state com-
mission or utility actively is encouraging potential cogenerators; or
(3) the firm has an ancillary benefit to gain from cogeneration. In
the first category are firms like Dow Chemical and a number of pa-
per companies that traditionally were cogenerators. Their previous
experience has placed them in the forefront of the return to
cogeneration. 37 t
California is the outstanding example of a state whose regula-
tory policy actively has encouraged cogeneration. By removing po-
tential barriers to cogeneration in natural gas regulation, offering
accelerated depreciation on new cogeneration equipment and insti-
tuting strong PURPA incentives, California has managed to en-
courage almost as many filings as the remainder of the United
States.
The companies responding to the third condition, the ancillary
benefit, are perhaps the most interesting. In this class are a number
of firms with a waste product that is combustible. Faced with envi-
ronmental regulation and increasing costs for disposal of this prod-
uct, these companies have decided to burn the product to meet
thermal and electrical needs. One of the most publicized of these
ventures has been the cogeneration plant of the Diamond Walnut
Growers Cooperative in Stockton, California. By burning walnut
shells, this group expects to earn $1,000,000 each year on electricity
370. See supra note 58.
371. Dow Chemical, for example, has been involved with cogeneration since the 1920s. It
already had 600 MW of cogeneration capacity at its Brazoria City, Texas plant, but subsequent
to PURPA, it has filed for qualification of 440 MW of additional capacity. See FERC Filings,
supra note 329.
sales and natural gas savings.3 72 Even in states where the price for
cogenerated power is not favorable, however, the cogeneration op-
tion still may be attractive if there are substantial waste disposal
costs to be saved by its adoption.
Many factors still inhibit the development of cogeneration, but
the decline of cogeneration has been reversed. Firms again are in-
stalling cogeneration equipment if they perceive the state regulatory
climate to be supportive of such ventures, or if they can avoid sub-
stantial energy or waste disposal costs.
VII. Assessing the Future
The FERC estimated that by 1995 there would be 16,600 mega-
watts of cogenerated electricity and the PURPA would have induced
5900 megawatts of that total.3 73 Table C shows the annual filings of
new cogeneration capacity.374 If filings continue at the rate of about
1000 megawatts a year, then there would be about 16,000 MW of
new cogenerated electricity by 1995.
Table C






* First quarter only
As already noted, however, a filing does not necessarily mean a
firm commitment to produce power. A concern may file an applica-
tion for qualification, while still evaluating a project, and subse-
quently decide against its construction. Indeed, two large projects
may not materialize because of failures to obtain purchase rates for
the electricity produced to make the projects economically feasi-
ble. 375 Thus, a systematic follow-up of the FERC filings should be
done to determine the amount of cogeneration actually coming on
line. It is entirely possible that no more than half of the capacity
projected by these filings is being developed, in which case the
372. Industry Examines Profit Prospects of Selling 'Cogeneration' Energy, Wall St. J., Feb.
19, 1981, at 31. Four new cogeneration projects in Florida involve the use of waste heat from
chemical processes, while a number of paper and pulp companies have filed projects that burn
waste wood and black liquor-a combustible, but highly polluting waste product. See FERC
Filings, supra note 329.
373. 45 Fed. Reg. 23,608 (1980).
374. FERC Filings, supra note 329.
375. A spokesman for the Bi-State Development Project and another that did not wish to
be identified both spoke of the difficulty of implementing a project without an adequate rate of
return. See supra note 325.
FERC may have overestimated significantly the amount of cogener-
ated electricity that will be available by 1995.
Another point of concern is the drop in filings for fiscal year
1983. If filings do not accelerate in later quarters, then the year's
total will be significantly lower than in the previous year. While
some of this drop may be attributed to the uncertainty created by the
AEP case, a continuation of this pattern almost undoubtedly would
be caused by falling fuel prices and the declining use of oil on the
margin by electric utilities. These two conditions have been produc-
ing lower energy credit payments and may have discouraged some
firms even from proceeding to the filing stage. Certainly when most
estimates of the potential of various energy technologies were done
in the late 1970s, few, if anyone, anticipated a fall in oil prices.
On the basis of the filings themselves, PURPA itself apparently
has not given a strong boost to cogeneration; when PURPA is cou-
pled with a comprehensive state regulatory policy to encourage
cogeneration, however, the results can be quite dramatic. The large
number of filings induced in California show that a coherent regula-
tory policy designed to remove a wide variety of institutional barri-
ers can be an effective means of encouraging the growth of a
technology.
The flexibility afforded states by the FERC's implementation of
PURPA, however, apparently has resulted in wide variations in the
degree of encouragement offered cogeneration. By leaving the deter-
mination of energy and capacity credits to jurisdictional utilities,
rather than prescribing detailed methods themselves, many commis-
sions essentialy have permitted utilities to offer cogenerators
whatever rates they desire. The lack of standard rates for facilities
with capacities above 100 kw, resulting in the need to engage in case-
by-case negotiation with the utility, appears to have discouraged fil-
ings in a number of states. Industrial representatives have testified
repeatedly about the problems of negotiating directly with many
utilities. Even though utilities may be required to interconnect, un-
willing utilities effectively can discourage development of private
projects by offering low avoided cost purchase rates.
With the resolution of the AEP case, the federal challenges to
the full avoided cost standard now should be over. The Energy User
News issues on cogeneration rate-setting under PURPA, however,
note the challenge of the final orders of Florida, Idaho, Kansas,
Montana, New York and Pennsylvania in state courts by one or
more jurisdictional utilities.376 Since all these states wrote fairly
comprehensive orders detailing methods to determine PURPA rates,
376. States' Cogeneration Rate-Setting Under PURPA, Energy User News, May 23, and
May 30, 1983.
it appears that disgruntled utilities have adopted a new forum in
which to oppose the avoided cost rule.
Between the reluctance of many utilities to negotiate fair
purchase rates with potential cogenerators and the litigious stance of
some of the more stringently regulated utilities, industrial concerns
considering cogeneration still will face difficulties initiating projects
for some time. In particular, these conditions will discourage firms
that have little use for the electrical output themselves, but would
wish to sell virtually all electricity generated to the utility. Unless
cogenerators can sell all electrical output to the utility at a price that
produces an acceptable return on the incremental investment,
projects are likely to be either terminated or wrongfully sized.377
Under these circumstances, cogeneration would receive more
encouragement if the FERC would mandate standard purchase rates
for larger facilities and set more explicit guidelines for calculating
purchase rates. In particular, a more uniform approach to offering
capacity credits would be useful. Since the Commission acknowl-
edged that setting capacity payments was indeed a difficult task, it
seems reasonable to give states more guidance regarding the condi-
tions under which such rates should be offered and the items that
should be included in them.
Some states currently offer mandatory capacity payments, while
others offer none and give no indication of a time when such pay-
ments might be offered. It might be required, for example, that utili-
ties offer capacity payments if they bring on line a new generating
unit, or plan the addition of a new generating unit, after a certain
date. A greater uniformity in approach, with clearer guidelines for
payments to be offered, would give potential cogenerators greater
certainty in evaluating cogeneration projects.
While many industries oppose amending PURPA to enable
utilities to have majority ownership of qualifying facilities, such an
amendment might encourage more cogeneration if private projects
were not obstructed as the result. By requiring utilities to set stan-
dard rates applicable to any qualifying facilities, including their own
cogeneration subsidiaries, utilities then might be more motivated to
set true avoided cost rates.
Finally, if cogeneration is to be encouraged, a coherent regula-
tory policy must be applied. Removal of utility barriers to cogenera-
tion while simultaneously erecting fuel-use barriers does not provide
377. Maximum energy savings from cogeneration are only obtainable when the thermal
and electrical loads are at the proper ratio for the mode of cogeneration employed. If a firm
cannot use or profitably sell all the electricity it can produce from a plant that meets its thermal
needs, then it may operate equipment to produce less electricity and thereby reduce energy
efficiency. For detailed figures on thermal/electrical loads for various modes of cogeneration,
see R. Barnes, Introduction and Overview, Wilkinson and Barnes, supra note 51, at 12.
a strong incentive for increased cogeneration. Thus, the recommen-
dation of the Government Accounting Office for the creation of an
office within the Department of Energy to co-ordinate and oversee
federal cogeneration policy appears to be reasonable.3 78 This office
should identify the constraints on cogeneration that could be re-
moved, as well as the potential problems of encouraging certain
forms of cogeneration.
Once the legal barriers to a technology have been erected, it is a
difficult task to remove them. Removing the barriers in one sector
offers little encouragement if barriers remain in another. Further-
more, there is ample opportunity for vested interests to wage legal
battles to halt the removal process. Many businesses are unwilling to
commit funds to projects that are perceived to be nonessential, while
these battles rage. Thus, while the federal legislative effort to en-
courage cogeneration has made notable gains, the revival still is a
tenuous one.
378. United States Comptroller General, Industrial Cogeneraion-What It Is, How It
Works, Its Potential iii (1980).
APPENDIX
Table l**
Comparison of Standard PURPA Rates and Residential
Retail Rates: Selected Utilities
(Spring 1982)
Std. PURPA Rate Retail Rate
State Utility (cents/kwh) (cents/kwh)
Cali- Pacific Gas 7.759 on-pk 5.798 Tier I
fornia & Electric 7.334 of-pk 7.566 Tier II
(-) 6.548 of-pk 10.560 Tier III
+ opt. cap. cr.
$33-1 10/kw/yr
Connect- Connecticut 5.5 on-pk n-f $7.35/mth +
icut Light & 4.29 of-pk, n-f 7.52
Power 5.65 on-pk, f
4.95 of-pk, f
Florida Gulf Power 2.629 on-pk, <100kw $5.00/mth +
(+) 2.213 of-pk, <100kw 5.903-S
2.052 on-pk, >100kw 5.368-W
2.106 of-pk, >100kw
Tampa 6.813 on pk, <100kw $3.65/mth +
Electric 4.378 of-pk, <100kw 4.188-750kwh
(-) 6.446 on-pk, >100kw 3.961->750kwh
4.142 of-pk, >100kw
Idaho Utah Power 2.2 n-f 6.8732-S
(-) 4.79 f 5.2532-W
Pacific 1.3 of-pk, n-f 2.677
Power & 2.0 on-pk, n-f $6.00/mth-min
Light 6.0 1-t
Illinois Commonwealth 5.31 on-pk, <10Okw,S $1.00/mth +
Edison 2.90 of-pk, <10OOkw,S 5.96-S






Union 1.77 fl-r,S $2.45/mth +
Electric 1.52 fl-r,W 5.45-S
4.62-10OOkwh,W
2.40-> 1000kwh,W
Indiana Northern 2.83 on-pk,S 11.810-50kwh
Indiana 2.46 of-pk,S 8.479-150kwh
Public 3.33 on-pk,W 6.690-200kwh
Service 2.75 of-pk,W 4.843-exc,W





Std. PURPA Rate Retail Rate
State Utility (cents/kwh) (cents/kwh)




Central 5.5 (temp) $3.38/mth-50kwh
Maine 6.770 l->50kwh
Power t-o-d: $9.69/mth +
(-) 8.7134 on-pk
4.0093 of-pk
Massa- Boston 8.000 on-pk, <4kv 2.67-15kwh
chusetts Edison 4.967 off-pk. <4kv 7.12-35kwh






Western 5.813 on-pk $3.77/mth-12kwh
Mass. 4.238 of-pk 7.75-338kwh
Electric 4.979 fl-4 4.51-650kwh
(-) 3.52-exc
Missouri Union 2.36 on pk,S 8.06-1OOkwh





Montana Montana- 2.16 fl-4,s-t 5.562-300kwh
Dakota 5.58 fl-r,l-t 6.900->300kwh
Utilities
New Public 7.7 n-f $4.50/mth +
Hampshire Service 8.2 f 7.249-200kwh






New Consolidated 6.0 fl-r, st.min. $4.06/mth +
York Edison 12.37 on-pk,S 11.95-1500kwh,W
4.77 of-pk,S 11.26->1500kwh,W
6.57 on-pk,W 13.095-15OOkwh,S
4.37 of-pk,W 12.766-> 1500kwh,S





Std. PURPA Rate Retail Rate
State Utility (cents/kwh) (cents/kwh)
North Carolina 2.8 on-pk, s-t $6.75/mth +
Caro- Power & 5.5 on-pk, l-t 5.831,S
lina Light 2.07 of-pk,s-t 5.831-800kwh,W
(+) 4.04 of-pk,l-t 5.101->800kwh,W
+ 2.39 opt. cap.,S
+ 2.08 opt. cap.,W
Duke 2.12 on pk,s-t $5.40/mth +
Power 5.02 on-pk,l-t 4.0462-360kwh
(+) 1.60 of-pk,s-t 6.2562-950kwh
1.60 of-pk,s-t 5.5262-exc,S
3.78 of-pk,l-t 4.7762-exc,W
+ 1.17 opt. cap., pk mths
+ .69 opt.cap., of-pk mths
Oregon Pacific 2.2 fl-r,n-fst.min 2.101-200kwh
Power & 2.47-4.399 fst.min. 3.043-1OOOkwh
Light 3.59 fl-r, 100kw 4.164-exc.
+$2.25-3.94/kw-mth
Rhode Blackstone 6.67 on-pk $2.95/mth +
Island Valley 5.08 of-pk 5.2
(-) 5.78 fl-r
South Carolina 2.8 on-pk $6.00/mth +
Caro- Power & 2.07 of-pk 5.285,S
lina Light +$3.89/kw-mth cap,S 5.25-800kwh,W
+$3.35/kw-mth cap,W 4.339->800kwh,W
Duke 1.98 on-pk $4.30/mth +
Power 1.49 of-pk 5.1307-1OOOkwh
+$5.00/kw-mth cap. 5.5807->1000kwh
Ten- Tennessee 3.2 fl-r, 100 kw $2.30/mth +
nessee Valley 4.49 on-pk 4.115-500kwh
Authority 2.8 on-pk 4.559->500kwh
Texas Houston FCA x (1.01-1.64) $6.00/mth-30kw
Light & (FCA = 3.0) 3.845 exc,S
Power 2.345 exc,W
Utah Utah Power 2.2 fl-r,n-f 7.0315
& Light 3.5 fl-r,f
(-)
Vermont Central 9.0 on-pk $5.78/mth +
Vermont 6.6 of-pk 3.375,S
Public 7.8 fl-r 3.375-200kwh,W
Service Corp. 11.813->200kwh,W
Vir- Virginia 3.815 on-pk,pk mths $5.50/mth +
ginia Electric & 1.815 of-pk,pk mths 6.500-800kwh,S
Power 3.441 on-pk,of-pk mths 7.719->800kwh,S
(-) 1.815 of-pk,of-pk mths 6.500-800kwh,W
5.003->800kwh,W
Wyoming Utah Power 2.2 n-f







Std. PURPA Rate Retail Rate
State Utility (cents/kwh) (cents/kwh)
Montana- .405 $1.25/mth +




** Key to abbreviations:
on-pk-power supplied at times of peak demand.
of-pk-power supplied at times of low demand.
int-power supplied at times of intermediate demand.
fl-r-power supplied at a flat, non-time differentiated rate.
n-f-power supplied on a non-firm, "as available" basis.
f-power supplied on a firm contractual basis.
s-t-a short-term contract rate.
-t-a long-term contract rate.
W-winter or low season rate.
S-summer or low season rate.
st. min-state minimum rate.
temp-temporary rate.





FCA-fuel cost adjustment factor.
opt. cap. cr-optional capacity credit.
(+)-PURPA rates revised upward since spring 1982.
(-)-PURPA rates revised downward since spring 1982.






























net billing opt. if
< 1000kw
Cali- Final Yes Opt. graduated cap.cr.
fornia E cr. based on oil
Colorado Final No N.A.
Connec- Final <1000kw No AIlow:VO&M,
ticut LLF, I&H, firm
power
Delaware Final <1000kw No min. 1 yr. contract
Florida Final Yes Neg. sys. E cr. + LLF
Georgia Pending N.A. N.A.
Hawaii Final N.A. N.A.
Idaho Final No Man. net bill opt. if
+ Opt. <100kw, min.c.f.,
graduated cap.cr.
Illinois Final Yes Neg.
Indiana Final Yes N.A.
Iowa Final No Neg. credits based on
pool billing rates
Kansas Final No Opt. rates based on
embedded costs
Kentucky Final N.A. N.A.
Louisiana Final No Opt.




Maryland Pending N.A. N.A.
Massa- Final Yes Opt./ net bill opt. if
chusetts Neg. <30kw; Allow:
VO&M, LLF, SS;
pk. hr.
Michigan Final Yes Opt. no net billing
Minnesota Pending
Table 2 (con't)
Rule Std. Rates Capacity Information
State Status Above 100kw Payment on Rates
Missis- Pending N.A. N.A.
sippi
Missouri Final No No threshold for cap.
cr.





Nebraska No state regulatory commission
Nevada Final N.A. Opt.
New Final Yes Opt. statewide rate; net
Hampshire bill opt.; Allow:
VO&M, I&D
New Final <1000kw No/ no cap. cr. if
Jersey Opt. < 100kw; E
cr.=pool billing
rate
New Final No Neg.
Mexico
New York Final Yes Opt. state min. rate; pk.
hrs. cap. cr.











orth Final No Opt.
akota
hio Final No Neg.
klahoma Final No Opt. rates to reliability;
Allow: LLF
regon Final Yes Opt. state min. rate;
graduated cap.cr.
nnsyl- Final <500kw Opt. Allow: VO&M
mia





















Rule Std. Rates Capacity Information
State Status Above 100kw Payment on Rates
Utah Final < 1000kw Opt. no net billing;
min. c.f.
Vermont Final Yes No. statewide rate
Virginia Final No Opt. net bill opt.
Washing- Final No Neg.
ton
West Final N.A. N.A.
Virginia
Wisconsin Pending N.A. N.A.
Wyoming Final No Neg.
** Key to abbreviations:
N.A.-information not available.
Opt-capacity payment dependent upon QF meeting certain conditions.
Neg.-capacity payment left to QF and utility negotiation.
Man-capacity payment mandatory.
Man. & Opt-small capacity payment required, larger one available upon meeting
certain conditions.
Opt./Neg.-QFs above a certain capacity must negotiate payment.
Allow:-allowances permitted in the energy credit.
VO&M-variable operation and maintenance allowance.
LLF-line loss factor allowance.





min. c.f.-minimum capacity factor required for capacity credit.
E cr.-energy credit.
cap. cr-capacity credit.

